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Contextualizing ADR in Managed Care:
A Proposal Aimed at Easing Tensions
and Resolving Conflict
Kathy L. Cerminara*
I. INTRODUCTION
Health care is dominated by conflicts and tensions. Conflicts arise
between health care providers and health care payors, patients and
health care providers, and patients and health care payors. 1 Tensions
mount as health insurance premiums rise despite efforts to contain costs.
Suspicions linger that cost concerns negatively affect the quality of care
patients receive. Health care effectively is managed care, and allocation
tensions, expressed and unexpressed, general and particularized,
characterize the system.
From the patient's point of view, the tensions permeating the health
care industry must be disconcerting. Health care is, after all, supposed
to cure, not create, problems. Patients seek help from the medical
profession and the health care system in times of weakness, times when
comfort and care are needed. Most patients seeking comfort and care,
* Copyright Kathy L. Cerminara 2002. Assistant Professor, Nova Southeastern University
Shepard Broad Law Center. J.D., University of Pittsburgh School of Law; LL.M., Columbia
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contributed thoughts, ideas and various forms of support throughout this project is so long that I
require nearly an entire article to properly thank them all. Nevertheless, I will try here. Errors are
entirely my own. Thanks go to: Professors Hal Edgar, Ken Goodman, Carol Liebman, Judith
McKay, Dennis Nolan, Bill Sage and Peter Strauss; and also to Claudine Burke, Rhonda Gold,
Lori Lewellen, Shelly L. Marks, Rhonda Sternberg and Sarah Tabor. I owe a debt of gratitude to
the participants in and my mentors at the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics Health
Law Teachers Conference, members of the South Florida Bioethics/Health Working Group and
participants in faculty workshops at my law school. Finally, I owe a special thanks to Joe
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1. All of these relationships, like all relationships, involve conflict, producing tensions and
possibly disputes. This Article will focus on conflict, disputes and tensions that arise between
patients and any of three possible adversaries: individuals providing care, institutions providing
care, or entities financing care.
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however, step into a bureaucratic, time-crunched setting in which even
health care providers who want to serve as empathetic caregivers
encounter barriers to doing so. The resulting conflicts and tensions
serve as antitheses to what patients require in times of medical need.
The health care industry, because of these conflicts, does not meet
most patients' initial expectations. Moreover, when patients attempt to
voice their displeasure with the status quo tensions increase, multiplying
levels of frustration for most involved. The uninsured seek access to
medical care, inviting obvious resource allocation tensions between
supply and demand. The insured similarly experience conflict and
tension; when insured Americans complain about their care or their
coverage, some find the legally available responses to their complaints
inadequate because of tensions between state and federal regulation. 2
Managed care has transformed the provision of health care in
America in ways many patients still do not understand or accept. It has
increased tensions by making the rationing of care more explicit than it
had been previously. It may magnify conflict by imparting a
businesslike, "cost matters" image to a setting patients previously
considered professional and somehow special. It has added layers of
approvals and paperwork to transactions and decisions previously only
communicated between patient and physician. The result is a system
through which patients must muddle as best they can.
Troubleshooting the American health care industry involves
consideration of all these conflicts and tensions. Many of these tensions
emerged or at least became magnified over the past few decades, as
health care payors began to manage care on a large scale. At about that
same time, patients also began to realize the inadequacy of available
legal remedies in certain cases. Suggestions for empowering patients3
2. Obvious examples arise in the struggles to determine whether state medical malpractice law
or federal employee benefits law governs disputes over care provided pursuant to employer-
sponsored health insurance. See, e.g., Shea v. Esensten, 208 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 2000); Shea v.
Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
3. Throughout my work, I have spoken of my overall goal as examining various ways through
which to empower patients in the health care system. See, e.g., Kathy L. Cerminara, The Class
Action Suit as a Method of Patient Empowerment in the Managed Care Setting, 24 AM. J.L. &
MED. 7 (1998). Empowerment can, of course, have various meanings. In one sense, a patient is
empowered when he or she wins substantively on an issue about which he or she had fought with
a health care provider or payor. In another sense, however, a patient is empowered when,
regardless of whether he or she wins substantively, he or she is able to voice concerns and present
his or her side of a story. Cf E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 3 (1988) (describing similar distinctions in various definitions of the term
"justice").
It may not always be possible, or right, for patients to prevail substantively. Thus, my focus in
attempting to empower patients is to ensure that they are able to voice their concerns and present
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have ranged from encouraging impact litigation in the form of class
action lawsuits4 to calling for legislation that would help ameliorate the
power imbalance between patients and other actors in the industry.
5
Other legislators, academics and consumer advocates have promoted
alternative dispute resolution as efficient, effective and empowering.
However, troubleshooting in such a case-by-case fashion may not be
the optimal focus of efforts to ease tensions and deal with conflict in the
managed care system. Tensions and conflicts will always exist,
especially in a system of limited resources. Rather than approaching
each source of tension or flashpoint of dispute as trouble, and seeking to
eliminate it, this Article suggests that corporate officers in the health
care industry implement a more broad-based approach to working
through tensions and conflicts with patients.6 A multi-faceted approach
to conflict management, rather than piecemeal efforts at dispute
resolution, could assist in easing tensions and conflicts. 7 By facilitating
information flow to patients, this conflict management approach could
help ease tensions arising from the bureaucratic process accompanying
utilization review efforts and medical necessity documentation. 8  By
imparting to patients a sense of procedural justice, this approach could
also help patients for whom coverage of care is denied accept that
"[they] can't always get what [they] want." 9
In elaborating on this proposal, this Article will further examine
various forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) that have been
used in a multitude of health care settings.10 Thereafter, it will review
some of the reasons cookie-cutter incorporation of such ADR measures
will not prove optimal in attempts to improve the health care system.
1
'
Rather, with such efforts, well-meaning regulators and health care
corporations merely erect barriers to resolution of the conflicts and
their stories-that they play roles rather than being spectators-in the changing health care
system.
4. Cerminara, supra note 3, at 7-9.
5. See Karen A. Jordan, Coverage Decisions in ERiSA Plans: Assessing the Federal
Legislative Solution, 65 MO. L. REV. 405, 464-72 (2000); see also Kathy L. Cerminara,
Protecting Participants in and Beneficiaries of ERISA-Governed Managed Health Care Plans, 29
U. MEM. L. REV. 317 (1999) (discussing legislation mandating disclosure of information about
health plan terms).
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part V.A.
8. See infra Part IV.A.
9. THE ROLLING STONES, You Can't Always Get What You Want, on LET IT BLEED
(PGA/AbKco 1970).
10. See infra Part I.
11. See infra Part HII.
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tensions permeating health care. 12 The fourth section of this Article will
set forth broad outlines of a conflict management proposal and will
explain why corporate entities controlling health care would benefit
from addressing, in a contextualized manner, all types of conflict, not
simply disputes. 13
In sum, this Article attempts to broaden the conversation about the
resolution of health care disputes with a modest proposal. That
proposal, simply put, is that health care executives should attempt to
resolve the tensions patients experience and the sources of patient
conflict at various points along the health care decision making process
rather than simply at flashpoints of dispute. Doing so will better satisfy
patients' needs for a sense of procedural justice, thus benefiting health
care entities in a variety of ways.
II. ADR HAS BEEN PROPOSED, USED, PRAISED AND
CRITICIZED IN MANY HEALTH CARE SETTINGS
Partially in recognition of conflicts and tensions in the industry, it has
become popular to propose alternative methods of resolving patients'
disputes with health care entities. In 1998, for example, a Commission
on Health Care Dispute Resolution, a joint effort of the American
Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association and the
American Medical Association, recommended that ADR can and should
be used to resolve health care coverage and access disputes. 14 Indeed,
some governmental agencies, private health care payors and health care
providers have incorporated various forms of ADR into the procedures
available to (and often required of) patients voicing complaints. 15 Some
procedures are internal, contained within the corporate structure of a
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. Robert E. Meade, Health Care Due Process, in INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION:
RECOVERING IN THE 1990'S AND BEYOND 1999, at 551, 597-98 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course, Handbook Series No. HO-002W, 1999).
15. In many dispute resolution systems, "complaints" differ from "grievances," with the
former signifying more serious disputes and the latter signifying relatively insignificant matters.
Carole Roan Gresenz et al., A Flood of Litigation?, RAND (1999), available at
http://www.rand.org/publicationsIPlIP184/. Throughout this Article, the term "complaints" is
meant to be all-inclusive, covering the broad expanse of matters about which patients might voice
displeasure. This Article will use the word "complaint" to encompass both expressions of
disputes and of feelings of conflict, while it will use the word "dispute" to mean a tangible and
unresolved expression of unresolved conflict centered around one or more issues and positions.
CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS 5
(1996). As will be seen in Part IV, the very range of subjects of complaints requires some
recognition in the dispute resolution process.
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health care entity, 16 while others exist entirely outside the corporate
methods of dispute resolution. 
7
Generally, ADR resolves disputes without resorting to the
courtroom. 18 However, various forms exist, some involving the courts
and some taking place entirely outside of the court setting.' 9 Some
forms of ADR focus on parties' interests, and some focus on parties'
rights.2° Some invite into the process others who are not party to the
dispute but who have expert knowledge in the subject matter of the
dispute. Generally, it is possible to separate ADR methods into three
16. Before pursuing disputes in court, patients often are required to comply with internal
review procedures. "Internal complaint or review procedures" means the levels of complaint-
filing and internal reconsideration that usually take place in any corporate setting when an
individual is dissatisfied with a product or service. When a person seeks payment on an
insurance claim and is denied, for example, he or she usually can and must request
reconsideration of the denial within the insurance company's corporate structure before
proceeding to complain about the denial outside of the corporate structure. See, e.g., NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS HEALTH CARRIER EXTERNAL REVIEW MODEL
ACT § 7(B) (2000) (on file with author). Internal procedures can be quite useful in resolving
disputes "[i]f both parties trust the integrity and judgment of these decision makers."
CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING
CONFLICT 9 (2d ed. 1996).
17. See, e.g., Managed Health Care Consumer Assistance Program, 2001 N.J. Sess. Law.
Serv. 14 (West); see also infra Part II.D (discussing Florida's managed care ombudsman
program).
18. ADR emerged as a viable force in the American legal system beginning "in the late 1960s
as a populist attempt to return the dispute resolution process to disputants." Deborah R. Hensler,
Science in the Court: Is There a Role for Alternative Dispute Resolution?, 54 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1991, at 178; see generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What Will We Do When
Adjudication Ends? A Brief Intellectual History of ADR, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1613 (1997)
(describing the seminal Pound Conference in 1976). It can take place in any of several settings,
from one that is private and contractually agreed-upon (such as commercial or securities
arbitration), to one resembling an administrative proceeding (such as labor arbitration), to one
subsumed within the judicial system. In the 1980s and 1990s, the idea of the multi-door
courthouse, providing access to the courts through judicially annexed ADR procedures as well as
directly through the usual judicial process, began increasingly to take hold. See Robert A. Baruch
Bush, Alternative Futures: Imagining How ADR May Affect the Court System in Coming
Decades, 15 REV. LITIG. 455 (1996); see also Larry Ray & Anne L. Clare, The Multi-Door
Courthouse Idea: Building the Courthouse of the Future... Today, I OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 7 (1985). History suggests, however, that ADR in general and the idea of the multi-door
courthouse in particular has deeper roots. See Valerie A. Sanchez, Towards a History of ADR:
The Dispute Processing Continuum in Anglo-Saxon England and Today, II OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 1 (1996) (discussing multiple dispute processing methods used in Anglo-Saxon England
in the seventh through eleventh centuries).
19. Arbitation, for example, can be court-ordered or contractually required. See Deborah R.
Hensler, ADR Research at the Crossroads, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 71, 72.
20. COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 15, at 45. Costantino and Merchant include,
additionally, power-based methods of ADR such as violence, war and strikes in their description
of ADR methods. Id. This Article will not consider such ADR methods because patients
generally do not have great sources of power in the health care system.
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categories: adjudicatory, consensual and advisory. Overlapping
methods fall into a fourth, crossover, category. Each type of ADR has
been used in the health care setting and will be examined in this Article,
with a focus on factual scenarios that involve patients and patients'
concerns.
21
A. Adjudicatory ADR Methods: Arbitration and External Review
The type of ADR that springs to mind for the casual reader is likely
arbitration. Arbitration closely resembles the trial process and for this
reason it is termed an adjudicatory method of ADR.22 It often takes
place, however, wholly or mostly outside of the judicial setting, in an
agreed-upon setting or in a setting chosen by the arbitrator or one of the
23 wh2 srvparties. It involves one or more arbitrators,24 who serve the same
functions that judges serve in hearings. Each party to the dispute
presents evidence, although the rules of evidence most often do not
apply, and the arbitrator reaches (or the arbitrators reach) a decision that
may or may not bind the parties, depending on whether a right to appeal
has been preserved by virtue of law or agreement.
25
Examples of arbitration in the health care setting are numerous and
range from the medical malpractice setting 26 to the patient-health care
payor dispute context. One well-known example of a mandatory
arbitration system that exists to resolve disputes with health plan
members is the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. ("Kaiser"). Kaiser,
a large, not-for-profit health maintenance organization based in
21. Other possible sources of conflict and tension, resulting in disputes, in health care are the
relationships between physicians and hospitals or other health care entities and employers and
employees. As noted previously, this Article will focus on disputes between patients and others
in the industry.
22. MOORE, supra note 16, at 9 (noting that, in arbitration, "an impartial and neutral third
party" decides contested issues for disputants); see also Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation
Lite": Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47
EMORY L.J. 1289, 1296 (1998) (calling arbitration an "adjudicative process").
23. SUSAN M. LEESON & BRYAN M. JOHNSTON, ENDING IT: DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
AMERICA 50-55 (1988) (noting that one question for parties to decide is where an arbitration will
be held and stating that disputing parties often give the arbitrator authority to decide).
24. MOORE, supra note 16, at 9.
25. Id. at 52.
26. Pre-lawsuit screening requirements in medical malpractice litigation may resemble
arbitration, or an adjudicatory method of ADR. See Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized
Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203, 216-17 (1996).
Alternatively, they may constitute mandated mediation. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 75-9 (West
2001), discussed in Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (11 th Cir. 1979). They even may
occupy their own category of ADR. See John F. Bales, Medical Malpractice Developments, at
563 (PLI Comm. Law Practice Course, Handbook Series No. A4-4455, 1994) (categorizing pre-
suit requirements separately).
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California, 27 has arbitrated disputes with its members since 197 1.28 In
1997, the California Supreme Court ruled that Kaiser's arbitration
system was seriously flawed and refused to compel arbitration in a case
alleging medical malpractice by Kaiser's doctors. 29 Thereafter, Kaiser
employed an attorney to establish an Office of the Independent
Administrator (OIA) and create a new arbitration system in an attempt
to correct the problems the court noted.3°
The original Kaiser arbitration system was designed, written,
mandated and administered by Kaiser itself, although members and
subscribers were not aware of this. 31  The contractual provision
describing the arbitration program to Kaiser members and subscribers
set forth a schedule for the designation and appointment of three
arbitrators and required the panel of arbitrators to "hold a hearing within
a reasonable time thereafter." 32  In spite of this provision, delays
occurred in ninety-nine percent of all Kaiser medical malpractice
arbitrations. 33 On average, it took 863 days for a hearing to be held in a
Kaiser arbitration.34
Under the current Kaiser arbitration system administered by the OIA,
much has changed. First, the OIA independently operates the
arbitration system. 35 Thus, Kaiser no longer occupies the dual roles of
party and administrator in the adversarial, adjudicatory proceedings.
Second, the revised Kaiser arbitration system has improved the speed of
the process.36 Parties may choose whether to proceed before a panel of
three arbitrators or a single arbitrator. 37 Whereas it previously took an
average of 863 days for a hearing to begin, it now takes an average of
213 days until the end of a hearing38 from the time the arbitration
27. Kaiser's involvement in managed care dates back to the 1930s and 1940s, when
industrialist Henry Kaiser established prepaid medical plans for his employees in California and
the Pacific Northwest. WILLIAM M. MERCER, INC., INTEGRATED HEALTH PLANS: MANAGED
CARE IN THE 90S, at 3 (1990).
28. Office of the Independent Adminstrator, First Annual Report, i, at http://www.slhartmann.
com.oia/index.htm (last modified Sept. 10, 2001) [hereinafter OIA Report].
29. Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 908 (Cal. 1997).
30. OIA Report, supra note 28, at 1-2.
31. Engalla, 938 P.2d at 909.
32. Id. at 909 n.3.
33. Id. at 912.
34. Id. at 913.
35. OIA Report, supra note 28, at 1-2, app. at 79.
36. Id. at 5.
37. Id.
38. Id. at i, 20-21.
2002]
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process begins. 39 Even though most of the cases arbitrated are medical
malpractice claims,40 the system also provides for arbitration of benefits
determinations in the same manner.
Other managed care organizations and insurers similarly incorporate
arbitration systems into their benefits determinations decision making
processes. In Florida, the Department of Insurance and the Agency for
Health Care Administration (AHCA) each have representatives on a
Statewide Provider and Subscriber Assistance panel, which handles
appeals on both quality of care and coverage disputes with managed
care plans.41 This statewide review panel functions as an arbitration
panel in the sense that it hears and makes decisions on appeals from the
decisions made in the plans' internal review processes. 42 Its decisions,
however, take the form of recommendations to the agency with
appropriate jurisdiction, 43 which is the insurance department over
payment issues and AHCA over quality of care issues. In the vast
majority of cases in which the agency concurs with the panel's decision
and issues a regulatory order to the managed care organization, the
managed care organizations comply with such orders.44
The latter example, the statewide review panel, illustrates the blurring
of the line between an arbitration system and an independent external
review of care or coverage decisions. There exists a trend toward
providing for independent external review of health care claims at
patients' requests when care or coverage is denied, generally following
an internal appeals process.45  Such external review seems to be an
example of arbitration in the health care setting, although not explicitly
identified as such. Federal legislators have proposed external review of
denials of claims for health care benefits based on conclusions that the
items or services in question were not medically necessary, were
39. Id.
40. Id. at ii. More than ninety-four percent are medical malpractice claims and less than one
percent are benefits or coverage claims. Id.
41. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 408.7056(2), 408.7056(11) (West Supp. 2001); see Wes Allison,
Florida's HMO Appeals Board is Rarely Used, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 23, 2001, at IA,
available at http://www.sptimes.com/News/032301/State/Florida SHMOappeals.shtml
(discussing the efficacy, or lack thereof, of Florida's Statewide Provider and Subscriber
Assistance Panel); see also FLA. SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH, AGING AND LONG-TERM CARE,
INTERIM PROJECT REPORT 2002-138 (Sept. 2001) (describing program and making
recommendations) [hereinafter FLA. SENATE COMM. REPORT].
42. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.7056(3).
43. Id. § 408.7056(7).
44. See FLA. SENATE COMM. REPORT, supra note 41.
45. MOORE, supra note 16 (discussing internal review procedures).
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investigational or were experimental. 46 The same proposed legislation
would make available external review of denials of claims for benefits
when the denials involve medical judgment.47 In Texas, a patient
disagreeing with certain decisions of a health insurer, a health
maintenance organization or another managed care entity must submit
his or her claim to review by an independent review organization if the
entity against whom the claim is made requests such a review.48  In
Arizona, health care insurers are required to provide external
independent reviews of utilization review decisions regarding coverage
or medical necessity under the coverage document.49
Some insurers and managed care organizations voluntarily provide
external review. For example, in Massachusetts, both Blue Cross/Blue
Shield and Tufts Health Plan have offered it.50  The Medicare system
similarly provides external review opportunities to patients seeking to
dispute determinations made by the agency. 51 Beginning in 1989, the
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) (now the Center for
Medicare and Medicade Services) required the Center for Health Care
Dispute Resolution to review all cases in which the manager of care
does not rule fully in favor of the enrollee. 52
Most such independent external reviews are actually forms of
arbitration because they result in adjudicatory-type, evidence-based
46. Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 2990, 106th Cong. §
1 103(a)(2) (1999). The American Association of Preferred Provider Organizations (AAPPO) has
approved external review guidelines for preferred provider organizations (PPOs) permitting
enrollees to request external review in the same circumstances. See AAPPO, AAPPO Guidelines
for Independent Review, available at http://www.aappo.org/guidelines.htm (last modified July 17,
2001). The National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) has delayed until July 2002
instituting an external appeals requirement as part of its accreditation process. See Independent
Appeals Requirement Delayed by NCQA Until July 2002, 9 Health L. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 840
(June 1, 2000).
47. H.R. 2990.
48. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.003 (Vernon Supp. 2001); see infra Part III.B.2
(providing further discussion on the Texas statute).
49. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 20-2533, 20-2537 (2000) (permitting patients to initiate external
independent review when coverage is denied).
50. Liz Kowalczyk, HMOs Doubt Patients Need Outside Review of Decisions, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 22, 2000, at C l, available at 2000 WL 3323457 (discussing low numbers of patients
taking advantage of voluntarily offered external review options).
51. Ann H. Nevers, Consumer Managed Care Appeals: Are the Available Procedural
Protections Fundamentally Fair?, 33 J. HEALTH L. 287, 323 (2000).
52. Id.; see also Roderick B. Mathews, The Role of ADR in Managed Health Care Disputes,
DISP. RESOL. J., Aug. 1999, at 9, 10 (discussing the Center for Health Care and Dispute
Resolution and how it provides independent and external review of appeals for Medicare
enrollees).
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proceedings before panels or individuals 53  who will make
determinations regarding the matters at hand.54 In most instances, the
reviewers are persons seen as having expertise in the medical matter at
issue.55 In some instances, the degree of reviewer independence may be
debatable.56  The effects of such independent external review vary; in
some instances the decision is binding on both the health care entity and
the patient.57
B. Consensual ADR Methods: Mediation
Mediation has been employed in the health care arena for years, both
as a recognized form of ADR and as a problem-solving technique used
on an ad hoc basis.58  Far from adjudicatory, mediation is completely
consensual, constituting assisted negotiation59 and resulting in definitive
53. In New York, for example, panels conduct external review of questions of experimental or
investigational treatment while individuals review questions of medical necessity. N.Y. INS.
LAW § 4914 (McKinney 2000).
54. The Center for Health Dispute Resolution (CHDR), however, reportedly uses both
mediation and arbitration in resolving the Medicare disputes referred to it. See Nevers, supra
note 51, at 323; see also Gresenz et aL, supra note 15, at 10 (noting that some external reviews
are advisory in nature). This Article focuses on adjudicatory, rather than advisory and consensual
forms of external review.
55. In Arizona, for example, independent reviewers of claims of "medical necessity under the
coverage documents" must be physicians or other health care professionals. ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 20-2537(D), 20-2538(B) (West Supp. 2000); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-16-
113.5(2)(c)(II) (West 2000) (describing professional requirements for independent expert
physician reviewers of health care coverage denials).
56. In Iowa, for example, the insurance commissioner creates a list of independent review
entities (which employ individual independent reviewers) by soliciting entity names from
potential corporate players in the external review process. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 514J.6 (West
Supp. 2001). Once a patient requests external review, the corporate health care entity initially
chooses an independent review entity for each dispute. Id. § 514J.7(l)(a). The independent
review entity cannot be corporately related to the health care entity. Id. Moreover, the patient
may object to the health care entity's choice. Id. § 514J.7(l)(b). Nevertheless, there could arise
situations under this process in which the independent reviewer was not truly independent.
57. E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 4914(b)(4)(A)(iv), (B)(iv) (McKinney 2000). In Illinois, in
contrast, the statute states that HMOs must submit to an independent physician review when
disagreeing with the patient's primary care physician on a medical necessity determination. 215
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/4-10 (West 2000). If the independent physician reviewers say that
the procedure or treatment in question is medically necessary, then the HMO must cover it. Id.
Presumably, the patient can continue to dispute an adverse determination. See also OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 3923.67, 3923.68 (West Supp. 2001) (discussing external review procedure where
insured is denied medical coverage or where terminal illness or experimental treatments are
involved).
58. It similarly has been used formally and informally for centuries in various types of
disputes. See MOORE, supra note 16, at 20-22.
59. Id. at 8 (describing mediation as "an extension or elaboration of the negotiation process
that involves the intervention of an acceptable third party who has limited or no authoritative
decision making power"); see also id. at 15. The presence and involvement of a third party
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resolution of a dispute only if the parties agree. While mediation
primarily addresses substantive issues of dispute between parties, it also
has the potential to smooth out various aspects of the parties'
relationships with one another. For example, it may help "establish or
strengthen relationships of trust and respect," 6° or it may assist parties in
terminating a relationship in a way that "minimizes costs and
psychological harm." 61 Mediation has been used in a variety of health
care settings, from allegations of low-quality care and bioethical
decision making to insurance coverage denial conflicts. 62
In Massachusetts, for example, the Board of Registration in Medicine
(the "Board"), in conjunction with the Program for Health Care
Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, has conducted a pilot project
called the Voluntary Mediation Program. 63 Through this program, the
Board, which is responsible for licensing and regulating physicians in
Massachusetts, can refer patient complaints about physicians to
mediation.64 These referrals, however, are subject to the consent of
both the complainant and the physician. 65 The parties meet in person
with one or two mediators to exchange explanations of their positions
and to work out a mutually satisfactory resolution. 66  Of the ten
complaints mediated between 1993 and 1996, nine were successfully
resolved, only four with monetary transfers. 67
Legal associations also have participated in health care mediation
efforts. The American Health Lawyers Association (AHLA), and its
predecessor organization the National Health Lawyers Association,
began an ADR service in 1992. AHLA offers mediation training to
members and other attorneys and reports that the program has grown
"outsider" is critical. See id. at 15-16 (describing mediation as "essentially dialogue or
negotiation with the involvement of a third party").
60. Id. at 15.
61. Id.
62. See generally id. at 31-32 (providing a general discussion of medical -malpractice-related
mediation efforts and listing other areas where mediation is applied).
63. Edward A. Dauer & Leonard J. Marcus, Adapting Mediation to Link Resolution of
Medical Malpractice Disputes with Health Care Quality Improvement, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1997, at 185, 205.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 206.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 207-11; see also Edward A. Dauer et al., Transformative Power: Medical
Malpractice Mediations May Help Improve Patient Safety, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 1999, at
9-11 (also discussing the Massachusetts program as offering encouraging insights into the
potential of medical malpractice mediation).
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steadily since its inception.68 Similarly, the American Bar Association
Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly has worked from a
model provided by the National Institute for Dispute Resolution to
mediate nursing home care disputes. 69
Bioethical disputes also provide fertile ground for mediation.70  A
great deal of work in this area has been done at Montefiore Medical
Center in New York. There, physicians and other caregivers found
themselves confronting patients and patients' family members who had
to make difficult decisions in situations ranging from end-of-life care to
organ donation. As a result, the medical center created the Bioethics
Consultation Service (BCS) to mediate bioethical conflicts71 among
patients, patients' family members, and medical professionals. 72
Members of the service, a nurse-attorney, an attorney and a philosopher,
all of whom have been trained in dispute resolution and mediation,
discuss cases with patients (if possible), their families, medical staff,
and others involved in the patients' care or the decision making
process. 73 The members of the service then act as neutral third parties 74
in assessing the facts of the dispute, identifying the parties' positions
and the relevant ethical principles, and assisting the decision maker in
making the required decision. 75
The use of mediation in bioethical disputes has been debated. At
least one author, Professor Diane E. Hoffmann, has suggested that
mediation should be treated with caution in the end-of-life treatment
68. Peter M. Leibold, Executive Notes, Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Significant
Contribution to the Public Interest, HEALTH L. NEWS, Sept. 2000, at 4.
69. See RESOLUTION OF CONSUMER DISPUTES IN MANAGED CARE: INSIGHTS FROM AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY ROUNDTABLE 111 (Naomi Karp & Erica Wood eds., American Bar
Association, 1997) [hereinafter RESOLUTION OF CONSUMER].
70. See Chad Bowman, Disputes Over End-of-Life Care Treated Increasingly With Mediation,
9 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1527 (Oct. 5, 2000) (describing the American Medical Association's
recommendation of the use of mediation to resolve disputes over end-of-life care).
71. Some might see such situations as presenting "bioethical dilemmas." In reality, according
to Nancy Dubler, most bioethical dilemmas are more properly characterized as garden-variety
conflicts that arose because of differing perceptions, understandings, interpretations and value
systems. Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Heroic Care Cases: When Difficult Decisions About Care Are
Near, Mediation Can Help Bridge Communications Gap, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 1999, at 7.
72. Id. at 7-8.
73. Id. at 7.
74. While employees of the medical center may find their neutrality challenged because they
work for the institution in which the patient is being treated, the medical center uses them because
of their knowledge of medical matters and access to information available only to employees.
See NANCY NEVELOFF DUBLER & LEONARD J. MARCUS, MEDIATING BIOETHICAL DISPUTES 51-
52 (United Hospital Fund of New York 1994).
75. Id. at 34.
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setting.76 Most, however, suggest that the use of mediation in the end-
of-life setting can help preserve the physician-patient relationship to a
greater extent than the usual ethics committee model, resembling
adjudication. 77  Certainly it offers an opportunity to those involved to
work out sensitive end-of-life issues with compassion.
C. Advisory ADR Methods: Early Neutral Evaluation,
Summary Jury Trial
A few advisory forms of alternative dispute resolution exist, and
while they likely have been used in health care matters, there seems to
be no documented evidence of such use. The advisory forms of ADR
consist of an early neutral evaluation system and the summary jury
trial.78 In early neutral evaluation, an expert or a judge in the subject
under discussion hears the positions of both sides, early in a dispute
(preferably before discovery has commenced). 79  Thereafter, that
evaluator will advise the parties of what he or she believes the
appropriate resolution of the matter to be. 80  In a litigation setting, a
former judge might, for example, advise the parties how he or she
believes a jury would rule based on what he or she has heard. The
parties may then use this knowledge to resolve their dispute short of
trial.8
Similarly, a summary jury trial can be used to predict the likely
outcome of a dispute in court.8 2  In a summary jury trial, both sides
present a summary of the evidence they would present in an actual trial
76. Diane E. Hoffmann, Mediating Life and Death Decisions, 36 ARIz. L. REV. 821, 826
(1994). Professor Hoffmann expresses concern, in part, that mediation based on consensus may
avoid "application of societal standards in reaching an agreement." Id. at 877. She favors using
mediation to resolve end-of-life disputes as long as mediation is appropriate for the disputes being
mediated, but merely urges caution in the decision to employ mediation. Id.
77. Robert Gatter, Unnecessary Adversaries at the End of Life: Mediating End-of-Life
Treatment Disputes to Prevent Erosion of Physician-Patient Relationships, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1091
(1999).
78. See generally Hensler, supra note 18, at 180-81 (briefly summarizing the advisory ADR
processes).
79. Sabatino, supra note 22, at 1298.
80. Id.
81. Id. (describing early neutral evaluation as a "variant on evaluative mediation" and noting
that its use early in the litigation process when cases have been filed is to "set a benchmark for the
parties to discuss settlement before the case advances too far into discovery").
82. Id. at 1298-99; see also Shirley A. Wiegand, A New Light Bulb or the Work of the Devil?
A Current Assessment of Summary Jury Trials, 69 OR. L. REV. 87 (1990) (stating that "the
purpose of a summary jury trial is to provide the parties with a realistic assessment of their
chances at trial without the time and expense of a full-blown trial").
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to an actual jury. 83 The jury deliberates, and then returns an advisory
verdict. As with the results of the early neutral evaluation, the parties
then can use the advisory verdict to facilitate the resolution of their
dispute without actually proceeding to trial. 84
These two methods of ADR seem to be primarily utilized in
situations where the parties have already begun to litigate their disputes
and seek to avoid undergoing the time and expense of a trial.85 Thus, it
is easy to imagine health-care-related cases in which judges suggested
one or both of these ADR options to parties before them, the parties
then participated in the process, and the cases settled without a record
because there was no trial and therefore no written opinion issued.86
D. Cross-Category ADR Methods: Arb-Med, Med-Arb and
Ombudsman Programs
Finally, ADR methods exist that are explicitly and unabashedly a
combination of more than one of the previously described methods.
87
Mediation-arbitration ("med-arb") and arbitration-mediation ("arb-
med") comprise combinations of the adjudicatory and consensual ADR
processes. An even more interesting and varied conglomeration of
ADR methods appears in ombudsman programs.
88
83. Lucille M. Ponte, Putting Mandatory Summary Jury Trial Back on the Docket:
Recommendations on the Exercise of Judicial Authority, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1069, 1070
(1995).
84. Thomas D. Lambros, The Judge's Role in Fostering Voluntary Settlements, 29 VILL. L.
REV. 1363, 1373 (1983-84); see also Ann E. Woodley, Strengthening the Summary Jury Trial: A
Proposal to Increase Its Effectiveness and Encourage Uniformity in Its Use, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 541, 547-48 (1997), discussed in Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury
Trial-Ending the Guessing Game: An Objective Means of Case Evaluation, A Comment on
Professor Woodley's Proposal, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 621 (1997).
85. See, e.g., Sabatino, supra note 22, at 1298-99 (describing both methods as taking place
after cases have been filed).
86. Determining, by examination of court files, whether such health-care-related cases exist
and how successfully they were resolved after either early neutral evaluation or a summary jury
trial would be a fascinating research project, but is beyond the scope of this Article.
87. One may suspect that many of the others remain less than pure also. For example, it is
probably the case that an ombudsman often mediates between the party seeking advice and the
party against whom a complaint has been lodged. Similarly, it is likely that arbitrators, like many
judges, sometimes slip into a mediation role if they attempt to settle matters before them.
88. Use of the term "ombudsman" in this Article is not intended to denote male identity.
While one occasionally sees the term "ombudsperson" used, e.g., COSTANTINO & MERCHANT,
supra note 15, at 205, professional organizations in the field use the original term "ombudsman"
as taken from the Swedish, justitieombudsman. See Larry B. Hill, American Ombudsmen &
Others, or, American Ombudsmen and 'Wannabe' Ombudsmen (Apr. 18, 1997), available at
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/ombuds/wannabe.html. For familiarity and ease of reference, I
similarly will use the term "ombudsman" rather than "ombudsperson" in this Article. See also
Real People Real Problems: An Evaluation of the Long-Term Care Ombudsman Programs of the
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In mediation-arbitration, a neutral party begins working with the
parties to assist the parties in negotiating a solution. At some point,
however, the mediator takes on an arbitrator's function instead of the
neutral function he or she had at the beginning. 89  Thereafter, the
mediator-arbitrator has the power to enter a binding decision for one
side or the other.90
At a hospital in Detroit, for example, members of a Comprehensive
Support Care Team ("Team") have met with patients and their families
to attempt to informally and consensually work out conflicts. 91 Under
that system, if disputes cannot be worked out informally in a mediation
setting, matters go to the hospital ethics committee, which has the
power to recommend a particular outcome based on its view of the way
a court would rule on the dispute.92 A member of the Team also co-
chairs the ethics committee. 93
In contrast, in arbitration-mediation, an arbitrator begins a hearing by
receiving evidence and acting as the decision maker. At some point,
however, the arbitrator steps out of the decision maker role and attempts
to mediate an agreement between the two parties.94 The cross-category
methods of med-arb and arb-med have been subject to much criticism
for their merging of what many view as incompatible roles. When a
neutral party begins to mediate a dispute, some wonder if the parties
will feel free to confide in the mediator or disclose weaknesses if there
is the risk that the mediator at some point will switch hats and become a
decision maker. Similarly, but perhaps with less vehemence, concerns
in arb-med have been expressed about an arbitrator's ability to break out
of the decision making role and become a neutral mediator of
Older Americans Act (A Summary) n.1, available at http://www.nap.edu/readingroom
/books/rprp/summary.html (last modified Dec. 26, 2000) (noting that "the term 'ombudsman'
carries no meaning with respect to the gender of the occupant of the position").
89. Sabatino, supra note 22, at 1299.
90. See id.; see also Barry C. Bartel, Comment, Med-Arb as a Distinct Method of Dispute
Resolution: History, Analysis and Potential, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661 (1991) (analyzing the
advantages and disadvantages of the med-arb process of resolving disputes).
91. Karen A. Butler, Harvesters: Alternatives to Judicial Intervention in Medical Treatment
Decisions, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 191, 209.
92. Id.
93. Id. The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law proposed a similar med-arb role
for ethics committees, except that it proposed that the committees' decisions be binding on the
parties in certain circumstances. Id. A court could, of course, review the committees' decisions.
Id. at 210.
94. Alan Bloom et a]., Alternative Dispute Resolution in Health Care, 16 WHITnER L. REV.
61, 65 (1995).
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negotiations between the parties.95 The latter seems to be less likely to
engender role confusion, although there may exist a tendency on the
part of the decision maker to retain substantive opinions about each
party's likelihood of success when moving into the presumptively
neutral setting. Concerns to this effect about either med-arb or arb-med
could conceivably be cured by providing for a change of personnel at
the switch over point of the process.
96
Ombudsman programs exemplify another form of ADR that does not
fit neatly into any one category. Ombudsmen, or committees serving
the functions of ombudsmen, exist to assist dissatisfied parties with
negotiating the applicable grievance system or understanding the
policies or procedures governing the decision making in question.9
7
Under some definitions, ombudsmen exist to advise those who are
complaining, rather than to work within a structured setting to achieve
some resolution.98 In others, they also are intended to help pursue the
resolution of matters brought before them.99
Two different types of ombudsmen exist. First, some companies or
institutions employ ombudsmen to work with internal complaints. This
type of ombudsman, the organizational ombudsman, is also known as a
private-sector, or a corporate, ombudsman.'0° "An organizational
ombuds[man] is a confidential and informal information resource,
communications channel, complaint-handler and dispute-resolver, and a
person who helps an organization work for change."' 01  While
95. See Thomas J. Brewer & Lawrence R. Mills, Combining Mediation & Arbitration, DISP.
RESOL. J., Nov. 1999, at 32-33 (stating that med-arb proceedings may pose "important ethical
issues" when mediation and arbitration are conducted simultaneously by the same person); see
also Elizabeth A. Hunt, Arb-Med: ADR in the New Millennium, 42 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 29
(2000) (discussing that a mediator may have difficulty with neutrality once a decision has been
made, but ultimately, the parties make their own agreement in the mediation phase).
96. Of course, in that event, some of the cost-saving benefit of ADR is lost.
97. Cf. Real People Real Problems, supra note 88, at 1-2 (describing the range of ombudsmen
programs for long-term care facilities in various states).
98. RESOLUTION OF CONSUMER, supra note 69, at 105.
99. The Ombudsman Committees of the Administrative Law and Dispute Resolution Sections
of the American Bar Association have proposed, for example, a definition of the term which
would include among the ombudsman's duties "tak[ing] appropriate action to aid in the resolution
of the specific issue or a broader, underlying problem." Ombudsmen Define Themselves, 1999
ABA ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, available at WL, 24-SUM ADMRLN 17.
100. See The Ombudsman Association History, at http://www.ombuds-toa.org/toa-history.
html (2000).
101. Mary Rowe & Dean M. Gottehrer, Similarities and Differences Between Public and
Private Sector Ombudsmen, at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/ombuds/g&rsimilar.html (last
modified Nov. 10, 2000) (remarks of Mary Rowe).
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employees of corporate or public organizations,' 0 2 they usually report at
or near the top of the organizational flowchart, outside ordinary
management reporting channels, to best retain their independence.
10 3
"Their purpose is to foster values and decent behavior-fairness, equity,
justice, equality of opportunity, and respect," with an emphasis on
ensuring respect for those with less power. 10 4 They keep inquiries
strictly confidential, and they typically do not investigate formally or
make management decisions; instead, they offer and explain options to
people who approach them with problems. 105 They may, and often do,
work for system changes in the organization.
106
The second type of ombudsman, the public sector ombudsman, is
more public-service-oriented. These classical ombudsmen
independently review governmental actions by "receiving and
investigating complaints about the administrative acts of agencies."'
10 7
These ombudsmen are concerned with ensuring that governmental
entities have followed the law.10 8 Rather than generating options for a
complainant, or assisting in resolution, they typically have little power
over agency action.109 However, they do have the power to investigate
and make recommendations." 0
In the spirit of public sector ombudsman programs, some
governmental entities have created hybrid forms of ombudsman offices
in the health care area. One example is the creation of state long-term-
care ombudsman programs in accordance with the Older Americans
Act.'" As a result of this Act, ombudsman programs have been
established in each state, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico;
102. Many corporate organizations have ombudsmen. See, e.g., The Ombudsman Association
History, supra note 100 (listing ombudsmen from various corporations). Managed care plans and
hospitals appear increasingly to be using ombudsman services. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Tapping
and Resolving Consumer Concerns About Health Care, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 335, 354-55 (2000);
see generally Exploring Alternatives, available at http://www4.od.nih.gov/ccr (last modified Aug.
21, 2001) (providing an example of an organizational ombudsman office established in a public
agency, this website gives an overview of the National Institutes of Health Office of the
Ombudsman, The Center for Cooperative Resolution, and explains the role of this office).
103. Rowe & Gottehrer, supra note 101 (remarks of Mary Rowe).
104. Id. (remarks of Mary Rowe).
105. Id. (remarks of Mary Rowe).
106. Id. (remarks of Mary Rowe).
107. Id. (remarks of Dean M. Gottehrer).
108. Id. (remarks of Dean M. Gottehrer).
109. See Hill, supra note 88.
110. Rowe & Gottehrer, supra note 101 (remarks of Dean M. Gottehrer). Public sector
ombudsmen often also can issue public reports. See United States Ombudsman Association,
About USOA, at http://www.usombudsman.org/aboutUSOA/association.htm (Jan. 2, 2001).
I 11. Older Americans Act of 1965,42 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3023 (1994 & West Supp. 2001).
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these programs were designed to provide patient advocacy and to
represent the interests of residents of long-term-care facilities." 2 Some
states also implemented ombudsman programs for Medicaid managed
care enrollees. 113 In Connecticut and New Jersey, the state legislatures
created offices of managed care ombudsmen to advise patients of their
rights and guide them through the appeals process regarding coverage
questions. 114
Similarly, in 1996 the Florida Legislature created both district and
statewide managed care ombudsman committees within the Agency for
Health Care Administration (AHCA)." 5  Each district committee is
intended to comprise between nine and sixteen members who volunteer
to assist AHCA in protecting enrollees in managed care programs by
receiving and assisting with the resolution of complaints regarding
quality of care. 116 As part of an entity engaged in protecting enrollees,
they arguably have an advocacy function. However, the committees do
not possess any authority other than to assist AHCA, which means they
primarily assist patients who call with complaints to negotiate existing
grievance processes and understand the provisions of their health care
coverage documents. 117
III. ADR PROPOSALS ARE NOT THE OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS TO
MANAGED-CARE-RELATED HEALTH CARE CONCERNS
The various ADR proposals that have been made and implemented
thus far address the question of health care conflict resolution in an ad
hoc, piecemeal way. Some malpractice suits must go to arbitration.
Some coverage and care decisions are submitted to external review.
112. See Real People Real Problems, supra note 88.
113. See Jane Perkins et. al., Executive Summary, Ombudsprograms and Members Advocates:
Consumer-Oriented Approaches to Problem Solving in Medicaid Managed Care, at http://nhelp.
org/pubs/mc 1998ombudxsum.html (Sept. 29, 1998) (discussing member advocates).
114. Garrett Condon, Patients' Advocate a First in State, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 8, 2000,
at Al, available at 2000 WL 23014159 (discussing Connecticut); Lindy Washburn, New Law
Creates a Health Advocate; Plan Offers Way to Contest HMOs, RECORD, N. NEW JERSEY, Feb.
3, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 5236706 (discussing New Jersey).
115. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 641.60, 641.65 (West 1997 & 2001).
116. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 641.65(6). The majority of the district-level committees were never
actually staffed. Melissa Harris, Law to Oversee HMOs Falls Flat: Florida's 5-Year-Old
'Ombudsman' Plan Lacks Cash, Volunteers, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 29, 2001, at Al,
available at 2001 WL 9205684.
117. This conclusion is based upon my own work as a member of the District 11 Managed
Care Ombudsman Committee, which serves Miami-Dade and Monroe Counties in Florida. See
generally FLA. SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH, AGING AND LONG-TERM CARE, INTERIM PROJECT
REPORT 2002-137, at 3 (Sept. 2001) (describing charge of district-level managed care
ombudsman committees).
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Some disputes are mediated. Some patients' health-care-related
complaints receive more textured treatment, for example through
ombudsman programs. But there is little or no consistency and perhaps
even less predictability in the system. A patient moving from one
health care plan to another, or attempting to express more than one type
of complaint often faces entirely different procedures from setting to
setting or complaint to complaint. 118 The patient receives little or no
assistance in negotiating the maze.
Perhaps such variability is inevitable while patients obtain health care
coverage from a variety of sources. But more important than the
confusion caused by this variability are concerns about the root cause of
the calls for ADR processes. Even if one assumes that many methods
of ADR are less expensive and time-consuming than litigating
disputes, 19 and that most of them permit patients more process control
than does litigation, 120  incorporation of ADR procedures as
accomplished thus far likely will not strike at the root of patients'
conflicts and disputes in health care. 121
In one sense, for example, health care and governmental entities
actually erect barriers to the effective conflict resolution by engaging in
adjudicatory ADR procedures. By mandating adjudicatory procedures
such as arbitration, health care entities infringe upon patients' abilities
to participate freely in conflict and dispute resolution. Similarly,
governmental entities' mandates of external review of certain health
care decisions, although often a result of patient consumer advocacy, 122
118. See Kinney, supra note 102, at 380 (describing current systems as "uncoordinated,
inaccessible, inequitable and non-inclusive").
119. Empirical figures on expense do not definitively indicate that ADR is less expensive than
litigation. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice
Through ADR, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 241, 276 (1996). As Engalla proves, whether
ADR participants experience less delay before resolution is governed by the efficiency and
functioning of the ADR system in question. See supra text accompanying notes 27-40
(describing the history of the Kaiser arbitration system).
120. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 3, at 99; Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences
of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 483
(1992) (discussing the importance of process control on participants' feelings about the
procedures in which they engage).
121. Eleanor D. Kinney provides a similar conclusion, with a slightly different focus. See
Kinney, supra note 102, at 383 (outlining six principles to be honored in attempting to "tap and
resolve" consumer health care concerns).
122. See also Tracy E. Miller, Center Stage on the Patient Protection Agenda: Grievance and
Appeal Rights, 26 J. L. MED. & ETHics 89 (1998) (discussing external review and the grievance
process); cf. Louise G. Trubek, Informing, Claiming, Contracting: Enforcement in the Managed
Care Era, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 133, 133 (1999) (describing internal grievance and external
review systems as some of the patient and consumer protections intended "to correct the
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have magnified deep-rooted conflicts about the scope and focus of
health care. Patients seeking to access external review systems to
resolve disputes find that their attempts at ADR create numerous
conflicts and sub-disputes before resolving anything.
Piecemeal incorporation of adjudicatory ADR procedures thus
creates and fosters further conflict, rather than easing conflict and
tensions in the health care setting. When ADR procedures are
incorporated in this manner, their focus appears to be more related to
current beliefs about efficiency (and to current fad) than to concerns
about easing conflict in the health care setting. Such a focus is not
optimal, will not satisfy many patients' desires for procedural justice,
and will do nothing more than increase layers of bureaucracy and
confusion for patients.
A. Free Participation Concerns
As noted previously, health care entities such as Kaiser 123 sometimes
mandate that their patients use arbitration in challenging health plan
decisions pertaining to coverage or care. Such corporate mandates raise
concerns about enforceability that can create and exacerbate, rather than
ease, tensions and conflict.
It is instructive in this regard to examine the employment arena,
where employers have similarly mandated arbitration of employee
disputes. 124 Mandating arbitration has not proven to be the magic bullet
reducing litigation of employment disputes. 125 Moreover, mandating
arbitration pre-dispute 126 likely will raise concerns about enforceability
imbalance that occurs when the incentives for cost containment in managed care
organizations .. negatively impact patients' health care quality and access").
123. See supra notes 27-40 and accompanying text (describing the history of the Kaiser
arbitration system).
124. It is instructive to look at employment disputes because of the agency concerns that arise
in both the health care and employment contexts. Of course, employer-employee disputes arise
internally within an organization, whereas health care entity-patient disputes are external to the
organization. See Aimee Gourlay & Jenelle Soderquist, Mediation in Employment Cases is Too
Little Too Late: An Organizational Conflict Management Perspective on Resolving Disputes, 21
HAMLINE L. REv. 261, 268 (1998) (distinguishing between internal and external conflict
management). Nevertheless, the parallels between unionized employee arbitration and arbitration
of patient disputes in health care are striking and deserve exploration despite the external-internal
distinction.
125. Id. at 263-64.
126. The considerations differ for post-dispute agreements to arbitrate a particular dispute
only. See Colin P. Johnson, Comment, Has Arbitration Become a Wolf in Sheep's Clothing? A
Comment Exploring the Incompatibility Between Pre-Dispute Mandatory Binding Arbitration
Agreements in Employment Contracts and Statutorily Created Rights, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 511
(2000).
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of the mandates, inviting more, rather than less, conflict over vital
issues such as private enforcement of publicly guaranteed rights and
assurance of knowing waivers of rights.
1. The Validity of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements
Most Americans obtain their health care coverage either directly
through their employers or as beneficiaries of someone obtaining
coverage through his or her employer. 127 In practical terms, this means
that in any individual case an employer decides to provide, or at least to
partially provide, health care coverage for its employees. The employer
purchasing insurance may negotiate with a number of potential covering
entities in order to choose one or more coverage schemes. Each of
these coverage schemes may require different payments from the
employer and its employees, and each likely provides different benefits
in exchange for those payments. The insuring employer signs a contract
with each covering entity outlining the terms pursuant to which its
employees will receive coverage. That insurance contract is negotiated
based on a group rate and covers all members of the employer's group
(or employees), much as a labor union might negotiate a collective
bargaining agreement with an employer and thus agree to its terms on
behalf of the members of the bargaining unit. 128
Some employers do not purchase health insurance but instead self-
insure. A self-insured employer draws up a plan describing the medical
care it intends to cover for its employees, and then usually hires an
insurance company or other entity to administer that contract. 129
Whether an employer purchases insurance or self-insures, all
employees typically receive promotional material and perhaps a
summary plan description 130 when deciding which form of health care
coverage they would like to receive as an employee benefit, assuming
127. See Clark Havighurst, The Backlash Against Managed Health Care: Hard Politics Made
Bad Policy, 34 IND. L. REV. 395, 400 (2001) (noting that "one reason consumers feel
disempowered in today's health care market is that most receive health benefits through their
employer rather than by purchasing the plan themselves").
128. See generally PHILLIP JACOBS, ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND MEDICAL CARE 24 (4th ed.
1997) (providing a pictorial representation of, and a description of, the employer-provided health
care system); see also id. at 32 (providing another pictorial representation).
129. A self-insured plan (also termed a self-funded plan) provides benefits without purchasing
insurance to cover the costs of those benefits, See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 54
(1990) (discussing a self-funded plan in the preemption context).
130. ERISA plan administrators must prepare a summary plan description (SPD) describing
the terms of the plan for distribution to plan participants and beneficiaries. See 29 U.S.C. §§
1021-1022 (1994 & West. Supp. 2001) (imposing duty and describing SPD, respectively).
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they have a choice. 131 Employees rarely, if ever, receive copies of the
actual insurance contracts.
A coverage contract may contain an arbitration provision, which
binds a patient wishing to dispute a health plan decision or action to
arbitrate that dispute rather than, or at least prior to, instigating legal
action. 132  The provision could require patients to arbitrate all claims,
both of coverage and of care, or it could require them to arbitrate only
precisely delineated, contract-based disputes. It could also require
arbitration of claims of any variation between these extremes.
Depending on the contractual language, patients could be required to
arbitrate statutory disputes 133 or contractual disputes. 134  Mandated
arbitration of statutory disputes, however, should not be enforceable
based upon precedent in the employment law arena.
In the employment law arena, the Supreme Court has enthusiastically
endorsed arbitration as a method of dispute resolution, citing efficiency,
speed, confidentiality, and public policy as codified in the Federal
Arbitration Act.135  The Supreme Court has gone so far as to uphold
131. Recent studies indicate that about sixty-four percent of families who are offered
employer-sponsored insurance have a choice of plans. Only about fifty percent of employees
who are offered such insurance have a choice of plans through their employer, but the percentage
of families with a choice rises when the choices of each spouse in a two-income family are taken
into account. Less than fifty percent of families can choose between a health maintenance
organization (HMO) and plans with fewer restrictions. Sally Trude, Issue Brief No. 27-Who
Has a Choice of Health Plans?, at http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/55 (last visited Oct. 29,
2001).
132. Such agreements usually require arbitration rather than going to court. See generally
Elizabeth Rolph et al., Arbitration Agreements in Health Care: Myths and Reality, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1997, at 153.
133. A statutory claim could arise, for example, through breach of a statutorily imposed
standard of care, see for example, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.102 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001), or a
statutorily imposed fiduciary duty, see for example, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1994 & West Supp. 2001).
134. A contract dispute may arise when a patient questions whether a treatment was medically
necessary as defined in the contract. With respect to quality of care issues, an interesting question
arises when the standard of care is set forth in statute, as it is in Florida. See supra note 133
(setting forth the standard of care, considering all relevant circumstances, as "acceptance and
appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers"). Specifically, there could arise
a dispute over whether the patient's claim was statutory or contractual in a situation in which the
parties provided by contract for a specified standard of care. Cf Dukes v. United Healthcare, 57
F.3d 350, 359 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that nothing in its decision applied to cases in which a
plan specifies by contract an applicable standard of care outside of the statute).
135. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994 & West Supp. 2001); see also
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-595 (1994 & West Supp. 2001)
(encouraging the use of ADR within federal agencies); see generally Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that a claim under the ADRA can be subjected to
compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration
application).
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contractual arbitration provisions requiring the pursuit of statutory
claims, as opposed to claims arising out of the terms of the contract
itself, through arbitration rather than the courts.136 In only one category
of cases has the Court refused to require arbitration of statutory claims:
cases involving collective bargaining agreement provisions purporting
to relegate union members' statutory rights to the arbitration process
rather than to the court system for resolution. 137
Indeed, in the collective bargaining setting, the Court has been
reluctant to permit labor unions to waive the jury trial rights of their
members, bound by a union-negotiated collective bargaining contract,
regarding statutory claims. Claims stemming from the contract, such as
claims that the employer did not provide a promised number of vacation
days, or claims that an employer discharged an employee in violation of
the contract, can go to arbitration if the union so agrees because the
union has the authority to speak regarding these matters. 138 However,
statutory rights that employees possess independent of their contractual
rights, such as the right to be free from discrimination, are in a separate
category and cannot be negotiated away by another. 139
In the labor negotiation setting, the union's position nearly amounts
to a conflict of interest when the question of arbitration of statutory
rights arises. In the bargaining process, the union might be willing to
trade off certain rights for other contractual benefits when an employee
136. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35; see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477 (1989) (compelling arbitration of a securities claim); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v.
McMahon. 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (compelling arbitration of securities claims and claims under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (compelling arbitration of antitrust claims). In
these cases, collectively known as the Mitsubishi trilogy, the Court established a presumption
under the FAA that statutory claims are arbitrable and required the parties opposing arbitration to
prove that Congress specifically intended that a claim not be arbitrable to succeed in that
opposition. Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Employment Arbitration and the EEOC, 27 PEPP. L.
REV. 1, 14 (1999).
137. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); see also Barrentine v.
Ark.-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (construing the Fair Labor Standards Act and
emphasizing Alexander's concern with the nature of collective bargaining agreements). The
combination of Gilmer and a more recent case, Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., at
the very least casts doubt on Alexander's continuing validity. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv.
Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998). In Wright, the Court refused to determine whether Gilmer had
overruled Alexander and instead discussed the clarity required to render valid contractual
arbitration provisions. Id. at 77. This Article will presume that Alexander continues to be good
law, as, indeed, it has not been overruled. Wright did not expressly overrule it, and the Court in
Gilmer took pains to expressly distinguish it rather than overrule it. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
138. See Wright, 525 U.S. at 78-79.
139. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51-52.
2002] 569
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
might not be so willing. 14° The Court stated that when Congress
endows individual employees with statutory rights, the right to a jury
trial regarding those rights cannot be prospectively waived in the
"majoritarian process" of collective bargaining. 14 1
The manner in which most Americans receive their health care
coverage mandates the same protections for recipients of health care
coverage as union members receive in the area of dispute arbitration.
Like union employees, insured Americans receiving health care
coverage through the workplace do not negotiate their own contracts.
Instead, an agent, their employer, negotiates a group contract for them,
in the same way a union negotiates a collective bargaining agreement
for employees. Unlike employees bound by collective bargaining
agreements that have been approved by the union membership, non-
union employees have a choice of whether to accept health care
coverage provided through an employer. However, given health care
economics, that choice is an illusory one indeed.
Like a union in the context of negotiating a collective bargaining
agreement, an employer is susceptible to certain conflicts of interest
when negotiating a health care coverage contract for its employees.
142
For example, the employer may be either more or less willing to trade
off price for quality than its employees. The employer may see the
waiver of a right to a judicial forum for various claims as an acceptable
tradeoff for a reduction in price or compliance with an extra quality
indicator. With regard to claims arising out of the coverage contract,
one might argue that the employer has the authority to agree to such a
tradeoff. However, the employer, like the union, should not be
empowered to negotiate away the employees' right to quality care, or to
statutory protections such as freedom from breach of fiduciary duty.
In sum, employees who receive health care coverage pursuant to
insurance contracts negotiated by their employers occupy a position
analogous to workers whose workplace conditions and rights are
governed by a collective bargaining contract negotiated by a union. An
employer, under reasoning analogous to the Supreme Court's labor
arbitration authority, could bind employees/insureds to arbitrate
140. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
141. Accord Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (11th Cir. 1997); see
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51-52 (discussing the statutory right of protection from discrimination).
142. See Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 919 n.1 I (Cal. 1997) (noting
an "inverse agency relationship" between employer and employees in the negotiation of a health
care plan and indicating that the employee may be able to argue that the agreement entered into
was unconscionable if it later turned out that the employer, when negotiating the health plan, was
not acting in its employees' interest but was instead considering its own interest in cost savings).
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contractual health care disputes. Such contractual disputes could even
include disputes about whether a particular procedure was "medically
necessary," if that term appeared in the contract as describing the types
of procedures the insurer would cover. But the employer could not
negotiate away rights granted to employees/insureds by virtue of statute.
For example, an employer could not negotiate away an
employee's/insured's right to a trial alleging that the insurer breached a
fiduciary duty owed to the patient under ERISA. 143  Similarly, an
employer could not negotiate away an employee's/insured's right to a
jury trial alleging the provision of health care in violation of state
statutes regulating the medical standard of care.
Thus, arguably, arbitration mandates contained within the terms of a
health plan are only partially enforceable. On one hand, the Court has
most recently endorsed arbitration, causing one to wonder whether its
union-related decisions are outdated. 144 On the other hand, time has not
diminished the concerns about the majoritarian process of achieving
agreements the Court asserted in the labor relations cases. 145  While
statutory rights can be prospectively waived, 146 concern for the
preservation of individual rights in a majoritarian setting should still
remain strong.147 There is no reason to permit agency waiver of a right
to a jury trial on a statutory claim, unless it is merely a change of
143. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1191 (1994 &
West Supp. 2001). The patient plaintiffs in one of the consolidated managed care class actions
pending in Florida apparently did not argue the union analogy when attempting to avoid
mandatory arbitration of their ERISA claims. See In re Managed Care Litig., 2001 WL 66439 at
*2 (S.D. Fla. June 12, 2001) (granting motion to compel arbitration of claims asserted by patients
of defendant PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc.), amended by 150 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2001)
(denying defendant Humana's motion to dismiss RICO claims, and dismissing, without prejudice,
all of plaintiff s ERISA claims).
144. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text (supporting broad application of
arbitration). Cf. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302, 1318 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (describing the Court's arbitration cases "in the last several decades" as having
"pushed the pendulum far beyond a neutral attitude and endorsed a policy that strongly favors
private arbitration").
145. See Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (rejecting the
argument that an agency problem invalidates state employee group medical plan's agreement to
arbitrate medical malpractice claims). Other considerations have been held to invalidate
mandatory arbitration provisions in certain health care cases arising under California law. See,
e.g., Cruz v. Pacificare Health Sys., Inc., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 398-99 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that health care class action seeking injunctive relief and disgorgement of profits under
state consumer protection statutes were not subject to arbitration).
146. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); see also Adams, 121 S. Ct.
at 1312 (stating that while workers in general are covered by the Federal Arbitration Act,
Congress can enact more specific legislation for a particular class of workers).
147. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974).
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attitude and public policy toward alternative dispute resolution in
general and arbitration in particular. 14
8
2. The Real Reasons Why Concerns About Validity Matter
Ultimately, of course, this agency concern merely scrapes the tip of
an iceberg representing concerns about patients' agreement to
arbitration within a health care coverage contract. For any waiver of a
right to a jury trial (on a statutory or a contractual claim) to be valid, the
waiver must, for example, be clear. 149  Even if clear, if a health care
coverage contract containing an arbitration provision is presented to a
patient in circumstances tending to suggest the patient had no choice but
to sign it, concerns about contracts of adhesion can arise. 150 In certain
instances, pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate have been held
unconscionable. 151
These types of concerns, although not likely to constitute legal
reasons to invalidate arbitration mandates, 152 present serious concerns in
terms of their effects on patients' feelings of participation in health care
conflict and dispute resolution processes. For more than legal reasons,
they raise serious questions about procedural justice-that is, about the
health care dispute resolution system's ability to make patients feel like
actors, rather than the subjects of action. Procedural justice research
148. The Court itself has noted the tension between these two positions, as recently as 1998.
See Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998); see also Rosetta E. Ellis, Note,
Mandatory Arbitration Provisions in Collective Bargaining Agreements: The Case Against
Barring Statutory Discrimination Claims From Federal Court Jurisdiction, 86 VA. L. REv. 307,
320-21 (2000) (noting that Wright "fail[ed] to address the ambiguity created by Alexander and
Gilmer and... deferred authority back to the circuit courts").
149. Drafters of provisions purporting to require arbitration of a statutory claim, in particular,
must be "particularly clear" in including the claim among those to be arbitrated. Wright, 525 U.S.
at 79. The standard is whether the waiver of the right to a judicial forum for statutory claims is
"clear and unmistakable." Id. at 80 (quoting Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708
(1983)).
150. See Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 1030-34 (2000) (discussing cases
involving arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion).
151. See id.; see also Engalla v. Permanete Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 919 n.l 1 (Cal.
1997). The court in In re Managed Care Litigation, dismissed summarily plaintiffs'
unconscionability argument, but only because it viewed the argument as one claiming the
arbitration clauses in question were unconscionable per se. In re Managed Care Litig., 135 F.
Supp. 2d 1253 (S.D. Fla. 2000). The court still examined each clause to see if it was so unfair or
oppressive as to be unenforceable. Id. at 1269.
152. In Gilmer, for example, the Court took a strong position against invalidation for such
reasons. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). But see Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302, 1318 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that the
disparity in bargaining power has been a reason to exempt employment contracts from mandatory
arbitration).
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suggests that patients will feel more trust and confidence in a system in
which they can play a role rather than in a system acting upon them. 1
53
In this field of research, social psychologists explain that people
judge social experiences in a variety of ways. For example, people may
react favorably to an experience because the experience turns out well
for them. 154  A concrete example in the health care setting may be
evident in an insurance coverage dispute. After resolution of such a
dispute, a patient may react favorably to the dispute resolution
experience if he or she wins and the treatment in question is deemed
covered by insurance.
Alternatively, rather than forming judgments based on outcomes,
people may form judgments about experiences based upon whether the
procedures governing their dispute are just and fair.155 Thus, procedural
justice research examines how people perceive social experiences as
compared with existing norms about proper procedures. 156 In the case
of the insurance coverage dispute, even a patient who loses, and thus
will not enjoy insurance coverage for the disputed treatment, may think
positively of the dispute resolution experience if he or she perceived the
experience as fair and just.157
Procedural justice research indicates that "decisions are more likely
to be accepted when the procedure used to generate the decision allows
participation by those affected.' 158  In general, according actors
participation most effectively involves delegating some control over the
process to them, such as the presentation of evidence and arguments.
159
This seems to hold true even if the actors in question exercise no control
over the decision reached.'60
Much procedural justice research has focused on legal proceedings.
Early procedural justice theorists, for example, attempted to determine
whether an adversary or an inquisitorial legal system best produced
153. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 3, at 94 (stating that more process control on part of
litigant results in higher procedural fairness rating).
154. Id. at I (stating that some people judge their social experiences in terms of the outcomes
they receive).
155. Id.
156. id. at 3.
157. One should also distinguish between whether dispute resolution procedures actually
render decisions or the decisionmaking process more fair or whether the procedures cause those
involved to believe decisions or the decisionmaking process is more fair. See id. (distinguishing
between objective and subjective procedural justice). Like Lind and Tyler in their work, this
Article will concentrate on the latter. See id. at 4.
158. Id. at 8.
159. Id. at 9, 35-36 (stating that some people feel the need to retain more control than others).
160. Id. at 93, 96-99.
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positive feelings of procedural justice among disputants. 161  Later
researchers investigated the varying effects of dispute resolution
methods on participants' feelings about process. 162 In the area of civil
commitment, researchers have investigated reactions to the commitment
process.1 63 Other studies 164 have focused on individual's feelings about
process resulting from encounters with the legal system through law
enforcement authorities, irrespective of whether a dispute was involved.
Procedural justice also has emerged as a powerful theory in areas
other than the law. Researchers have examined, for example, the
procedural justice effects of various methods of issue resolution in the
political arena. 165  In the workplace, organizational procedural justice
research has suggested that workers' subjective perceptions of the
justice with which they are treated impacts their work performance in a
variety of ways. 166 There seems to be no reason that procedural justice
judgments do not also factor into patients' attitudes toward and
161. J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
(1975).
162. LIND & TYLER, supra note 3, at 99 (describing studies).
163. Tyler, supra note 120, at 434. Civil commitment hearings are proceedings at which
professional or judicial decision makers judge a person's mental competence for purposes of
determining whether the individual should be committed to a mental health facility. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 266 (7th ed. 1999).
164. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 3, at 56-57 (describing the study).
165. Id. at 147-63. Lind and Tyler suggest, for example, that the public will accept even
difficult budget decisions more readily if those decisions were reached as a result of a process
seen as fair. Id. at 163. Such a conclusion has interesting implications for the health care plan
contracting process between health care organizations and employers seeking to obtain health
care coverage for their employees. Perhaps if employees (and, indirectly, their beneficiaries)
were more involved in cost/benefit tradeoffs up front, in this contracting process, they would
express less dissatisfaction when coverage is later denied. Indeed, this may tend to support levels
of satisfaction for cafeteria plans, in which employees are able to make their own tradeoffs as
they choose among benefits with a budget.
166. Id. at 177-200. The construction of the Panama Canal, of all things, appears to offer an
example of this principle in action, decades before procedural justice became a known field.
After much managerial upheaval in a difficult project facing seemingly insurmountable odds,
President Theodore Roosevelt in 1907 appointed a new chairman and chief engineer, George
Goethals, who instituted a new approach. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, THE PATH BETWEEN THE
SEAS: THE CREATION OF THE PANAMA CANAL 1870-1914, at 508-10 (1977). Among the
changes Goethals instituted were increases in the availability of information and "his own court
of appeal." Id. at 537. Specifically, every Sunday morning he met personally with any worker on
whatever that worker perceived to be a serious problem. Id. Workers of all types first met with
an aide of Goethals' for an initial screening. Id. "[Oiften these preliminary interviews were
enough to resolve the problem-the mere process of free expression gave the needed relief." Id.
He personally, however, would meet with any person not satisfied with the results of such an
initial meeting. Id. at 537-38. Whether or not matters could be resolved to their satisfaction,
workers, because they were treated with respect, responded by giving their best, and morale rose.
Id. at 538.
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satisfaction with the health care industry. Given this, any procedure that
breeds concern about agency problems, patients' knowledge, adhesion
and unconscionability raises concerns that patients will feel negatively
in a procedural justice sense.
B. ERISA Preemption Concerns
In some instances, rather than having arbitration forced on patients so
as to raise procedural justice concerns, patients and patient consumer
advocates have lobbied for ADR mandates in health care. In some
states, for example, citizens have lobbied legislatures to require
independent external review of patient disputes with managed care
organizations.1 67  On a federal level, Congress has considered
legislative proposals incorporating external review provisions as part of
an attempt to interject patient protections into the managed care
system. 168  In these instances, rather than feeling directed into
arbitration, patients (speaking generally) are forcing health care entities
to consult independent physicians when they are unhappy with the
decisions of those entities.
Many times patient insistence has produced the desired result. Some
governmental agencies require external review of various health care
determinations. 169 Some state legislatures have required participation in
independent external review or have required that independent external
review be made available in claims resolution procedures. 170  In the
federal government, legislators are contemplating mandated
independent external review. 171 Even without additional legislation,
regulators on the federal level have issued at least one proposal for
mandating external review in health care disputes. 17
2
167. See generally Trubek, supra note 122.
168. See generally Phyllis C. Borzi & Sara Rosenbaum, Pending Patient Protection
Legislation: A Comparative Analysis of Key Provisions of the House and Senate Versions of H.R.
2990, ALI-ABA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., ERISA FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY ISSUES
UPDATE: QUALIFIED PENSION AND 401(K) PLANS, ESOPs, AND MANAGED CARE PLANS, June
15, 2000, at I n.1 (detailing and comparing various pieces of proposed patient protection
legislation).
169. See Nevers, supra note 51, at 311.
170. Thirty-eight states plus the District of Columbia have instituted some form of external
review. State Legislation: Despite Deadlock in Congress, States Moving Forward on Key
Managed Care Issues, 9 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1003 (June 29, 2000).
171. See generally Borzi & Rosenbaum, supra note 168.
172. The Department of Labor proposed draft regulations to be promulgated at 29 C.F.R.
2560, 63 Fed. Reg. 48390 (Sept. 9, 1998), and issued them on November 20, 2000 to take effect
in 2002. New Rules Issued on Health Appeals, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
aponline/national/AP-Health-Care-Appeals.html; see also 6 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1253 (Oct. 18,
2000); Report of the President's Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in Health Care
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Attempts at mandates, however, do not help patients resolve disputes
more expeditiously or with less conflict. Rather, they actually
encourage conflict and divisiveness by resulting in disparate treatment
of various classes of patients depending on whether they obtain their
health care coverage through their employment or elsewhere. Health
care plans obtained through employment are governed by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 173 State government
attempts at mandating external review, to the extent they impact
ERISA-governed health plans, have met a variety of legal challenges,
described below, that result in confusing categorization of both claims
and patients.
1. The Basics of ERISA Preemption
Concerns about ERISA preemption loom large any time a state
regulates in the field of health care coverage obtained as an employee
benefit. To the extent that states pass laws affecting all managed care
entities, insurers and health maintenance organizations, inevitably some
of the affected entities will be providing, and arranging for coverage of,
health care to patients who received their health care coverage through
their workplace. 174  Thus, broadly worded statutes that purport to
mandate the inclusion of external review provisions in all health plans
or insurance contracts impact ERISA-governed health plans. If such
statutes "relate to" those affected ERISA plans within the meaning of
ERISA's preemption provision, 175 they generally will be invalid.
ERISA preemption on its face does not seem complex. ERISA
provides first that it preempts "any and all state laws insofar as they...
relate to any employee benefit plan."' 176 There is one exception: if the
state law in question regulates insurance, ERISA will not preempt it.
17 7
However, some employers who provide health care coverage do not
actually purchase that coverage from insurance companies or other
coverage providers. Instead, they self-insure, or cover the expenses of
medical care themselves. State laws that regulate insurance do not
(supporting independent review in cases involving questions of medical necessity and
experimental or investigational treatment).
173. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
174. The inevitability arises because a majority of Americans today receive their coverage
through their own jobs or as beneficiaries of others' employer-sponsored health care plans. See
ROBERT L. BENNEFIELD, THE HAVES AND HAVE NOTS 1 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce 1998)
(noting that 70.1% of Americans in 1997 received health care coverage either through their
employment (61.4%) or through individual purchase (8.7%)).
175. 29U.S.C. § 1144(1994).
176. Id. § 1144(a).
177. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
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regulate self-insured plans; instead, ERISA preempts those laws insofar
as they might apply to the self-insured setting.
178
Despite its facial simplicity, attempts to flesh out the particulars of
ERISA preemption have resulted in confusion. The Supreme Court
initially took an extremely expansive view of the term "relates to," but
fairly recently modified that view, instructing courts to examine both
the preemption provision and the objectives of the ERISA statute as a
whole when applying the preemption provision in individual cases.
179
Clearly that state regulation with indirect economic effects on the costs
of health care plans will not be preempted by ERISA. 180  It is also
conversely clear that state regulation attempting to dictate the terms
under which a health plan must operate will be preempted.18' The
question is where along the intervening continuum a state's mandate for
the inclusion of external review procedures might fall.
2. Conflicting Views of Preemption As Applied to External
Review Mandates
However, the question of where state mandate of external review
enters the picture is not easily answered. There currently exists a split
among the circuits leading the Supreme Court to review the issue. The
Fifth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit have taken divergent approaches to
a perplexing question that leaves most court-watchers, including many
judges, stymied.
In Corporate Health Insurance, Inc. v. Texas Department of
Insurance,182 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
considered this specific issue. Texas passed a law providing in part for
178. Id. § 1144. Specifically, the law provides that self-insured plans shall not be "deemed"
to be insurance companies for purposes of the preemption analysis.
179. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers, 514 U.S. 645,
655 (1995).
180. Id. at 660. In Travelers, the Supreme Court ruled that ERISA did not preempt a New
York law that required hospitals to collect surcharges from patients with commercial insurance
but not from patients insured by Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans. Id. at 649. The law also imposed
varying surcharges on HMOs depending on the number of Medicaid recipients they enrolled. Id.
181. E.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (ruling that ERISA did not
preempt a New York disability benefits law to the extent that the law did not cover areas already
regulated by ERISA); see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)
(concluding that a Massachusetts insurance law mandating mental health coverage in group
insurance contracts was only saved from ERISA preemption by the ERISA savings clause). The
Shaw Court's expansive reading of ERISA's preemption provision has been narrowed somewhat,
but nothing suggests that the outcome of Shaw would be different under the Court's current
approach to ERISA preemption. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Travelers, Reasoned Textualism, and
the New Jurisprudence of ERISA Preemption, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 808 (2000).
182. Corp. Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000).
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independent review of "adverse determinations" by managed care
entities. 183  The statute also provided for independent review of
"claims," which differed from "adverse determinations."'' 84 "Claims,"
at least according to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, were
contentions that the managed care entity violated the applicable
standard of care in providing medical care. 185  "Adverse
determinations," however, were decisions that "the health care services
furnished or proposed to be furnished to an enrollee [were] not
medically necessary or ... not appropriate." 186  In other words,
according to the court, adverse determinations included determinations
by managed care entities as to coverage, rather than actions that
represented a physician's departure from the applicable standard of care
under the aegis of the managed care entity.
Using this dichotomy, the court determined that the independent
review provision applicable to claims was not preempted by ERISA, but
found that the independent review provision applicable to adverse
determinations was preempted by ERISA. 18 7 It did so for two reasons.
First, it noted that the provision mandating independent review of
"claims" applied only if the managed care entity requested it. 188 As
such, the entity could not argue that the state was imposing duties in
addition to or at odds with its duties under ERISA with regard to that
statutory provision. 189 Nothing was imposed upon the health care
entity; matters would end up in independent review only if the entity
whose decision was being challenged requested such review. 190
Second, the court ruled that independent review of claims did not
impose duties that fell within the purview of ERISA regulation. 191
Claims involved determinations of whether physicians had acted
properly under the applicable standard of care, a matter traditionally
under state regulation. 192  Independent review of adverse
determinations, by contrast, did not concern "negligent decisions by a
183. Id. at 531, 537.
184. Id. at 536.
185. Id.
186. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 20A.12A(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2000-01); see also Corp. Health
Ins., Inc., 215 F.3d at 537 (quoting section 20A.12A(a)(1)).
187. Corp. Health Ins., Inc., 215 F.3d at 536-37.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.; see also id. at 534-35 (pointing out that managed care providers operate in a
traditional sphere of state authority).
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physician."' 193  Such independent review instead "allow[ed] a patient
who has been denied coverage to appeal to an outside organization."' 194
Requiring the addition of a procedure through which a patient may
appeal a denial of coverage requires revision of the administrative
scheme governing benefits, and is within ERISA's purview.
Although the court believed that the Texas law regulated insurance
and thus could be "saved" under ERISA's preemption savings clause, it
ruled that the law directly conflicted with ERISA's enforcement scheme
by providing an alternative way for a patient to obtain coverage or
benefits. 195  Due to this direct conflict, the independent review
provisions applying to adverse determinations (but not those applying to
claims) were preempted by ERISA.
In contrast, in Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.,19 6 the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals held that ERISA does not preempt an Illinois
statute mandating independent physician review of a health
maintenance organization's (HMO's) medical necessity
determinations. 197  Such a statute is saved from preemption because it
193. id. at 537.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 121 S. Ct. 2589 (2001) (No. 00-1021).
197. In Moran, a patient suffered from nerve compression and wanted to undergo
microneurolysis surgery performed by a surgeon who was not a member of her health
maintenance organization's (HMO's) network. Moran, 230 F.3d at 963. Although her primary
care physician requested approval of the surgery, her HMO refused to authorize it, causing the
patient to undergo the surgery and pay for it herself; the surgery and post-operative care cost
nearly $95,000. Id. at 964. Before finally refusing authorization, the HMO had considered the
opinions of two thoracic surgeons affiliated with it who examined the patient and agreed with the
out-of-network surgeon's diagnosis but recommended another, less extensive, standard, surgical
procedure. Id. at 963. The HMO informed the patient it would have paid for that procedure. Id.
at 964.
After undergoing the surgery, the patient submitted a copy of her bill and treatment and
documentation to her HMO and asked for coverage. Id. The HMO consulted with three
additional doctors, two of whom were skeptical of the need for the microneurolysis surgery and
one of whom opined definitively that it was unnecessary. Id.
Even before undergoing the surgery the patient had made a written demand that the HMO
comply with Illinois law and submit to independent physician review for the dispute between her
primary care physician and the HMO about the medical necessity of the surgery. Id.; see 215 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/4-10 (West 2000). The HMO initially refused to do so, but eventually
complied with a state court ruling requiring it to do so. Moran, 230 F.3d at 964-65. The
independent physician concluded that microneurolysis surgery was medically necessary but said
that he would have used a different technique in performing it. Id. at 965.
After all of these reviews and opinions, the HMO again concluded that the surgery had not
been medically necessary and denied coverage. Id.
The patient took the HMO to court to enforce another portion of Illinois' independent review
statute, which requires HMOs to cover treatment if the independent physician who had reviewed
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regulates insurance, under the court's view of HMOs as members of the
insurance industry. 198 . The Illinois statute, by operation of law, adds a
mandatory term (an independent review requirement) to every insurance
contract between HMOs and Illinois subscribers. 199 Thus, rather than
substituting the medical judgment of a third party physician for that of
the HMO, constituting an alternative method by which to seek benefits
under the terms of a plan, the statute merely added to each HMO
contract an internal mechanism for making medical necessity
determinations. 20 0 A patient eventually might have to rely upon ERISA
to enforce the terms of the contract, but the HMO would have to
undergo the state's statutorily mandated procedure as part of the state-
law-imposed terms of its insurance contract. 20 1
3. The Real Reasons Why ERISA Preemption Concerns Matter
ERISA preemption concerns, and the legal confusion resulting from
conflicting decisions such as Corporate Health Insurance and Moran,
symbolize the complexity of the barriers to conflict resolution in the
health care system. The average patient likely does not think about
ERISA preemption when thinking about health care. The average
patient likely does not know, or care, about ERISA at all. Yet when that
patient attempts to resolve a health care dispute, ERISA preemption
concerns almost inevitably increase the layers of issues to be resolved.
Take, for example, the issue that lies at the root of ERISA preemption
analysis: whether a patient engaged in a dispute with a managed care
organization is seeking coverage (payment of a benefit) or care
(treatment). 20 2  A patient asking her managed care organization for
preauthorization of a hospital admission, that her physician says is
medically necessary, believes she is asking for the authorization of
the request for coverage had opined that the treatment was medically necessary. Id.; see 215 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/4-10 (West 2000).
198. Moran, 230 F.3d at 969.
199. Id. at 969-70.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 970-72.
202. The dichotomy between coverage and care first surfaced in ERISA preemption cases in
1995, with Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995). Recently, in Pegram
v. Herdrich, the United States Supreme Court seemed to acknowledge the same sort of distinction
and, indeed, to approve of it, although in a non-preemption context. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530
U.S. 211, 237 (2000); Edward A. Zelinsky, Pegram and Preemption: Patients' Rights and The
Case for Doing Nothing, TAX NoTEs 1053, 1055 (Aug. 21, 2000). But see William M. Sage, UR
Here: The Supreme Court's Guide for Managed Care, 19 HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 219,
221 (describing "the line between coverage and care" as "continu[ing] to fade after Pegram").
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medical care. The managed care organization refusing the
preauthorization says it is making a benefits, or coverage, decision
when it disagrees with the physician's determination that hospitalization
is medically necessary. If the patient is correct in her belief that care is
at issue, state law, including state-mandated external review, will apply.
If the managed care organization is correct, the state's attempted
mandate of external review will be ineffective because it is preempted
by ERISA.
It appears as if this example concerning preauthorization of
hospitalization 20 3 would constitute an "adverse determination" under the
Texas statute at issue in Corporate Health Insurance.20 4  Consistent
with its earlier precedent,20 5 the Fifth Circuit ruled in Corporate Health
Insurance that such decisions constituted coverage decisions and thus
were preempted.2 6 It is difficult to see, however, how such "adverse
determinations" fall easily and completely on the coverage rather than
the quality of care side of the line, and one might wonder if this aspect
of Corporate Health Insurance will survive as time passes and the
health care system develops further. 20
7
The line between coverage and care thus appears to be both preserved
and smudged under current law. The court in Corporate Health
Insurance attempted to draw that line in ruling that ERISA preempted
some but not all external review mandates in Texas. 20 8 According to
that court, some managed care decisions relate to quality of care and
some are coverage decisions; review of such decisions may impact
either coverage or care, and thus may or may not be preempted. 2°9 In
Moran, however, the court ruled that a statute imposing an external
review requirement amended insurance contracts by operation of law.
As an amendment to the contract, the external review requirement
203. This example derives from the facts of Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d
1321 (5th Cir. 1992). In Corcoran, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
recognized that medical and administrative decisions sometimes overlap, as they did on those
facts, but ruled that medical decisions made in the context of coverage determination still related
to coverage rather than to quality of care. Id. at 1331.
204. Under the statute, adverse determinations are decisions that "the health care services
furnished or proposed to be furnished ... are not medically necessary or are not appropriate."
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 20A.12A(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2000-01).
205. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1331.
206. The Supreme Court in Pegram, however, seemed to hint that such decisions concerned
quality of care, at least for purposes of ERISA fiduciary duty law. See Pegram, 530 U.S. 211
(2000).
207. See Sage, supra note 202.
208. See Corp. Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 531 (5th Cir. 2000).
209. Id. at 539-40.
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merely described procedures to be followed in determining coverage,
and did not implicate attempts to ensure quality of care.21° In fact, the
distinction between coverage and care makes little sense, 211 especially
to patients, who know only that they must obtain authorization from
their managed care organizations to access care.
The courts' holdings in Corporate Health Insurance and Moran thus
conflict on an extraordinarily important and complex preemption issue
which determines whether state-mandated external review procedures
will apply when patients receive health care benefits through
employment.212 The U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
Moran,213 but until it rules, the law is unclear.
The prevailing confusion and categorization create a multitude of
problems. The source of a patient's health care coverage should not
determine whether external review can be mandated, regardless of
whether the patient or the health care entity would like to see that
external review occur. Tensions thus arise because different patients
experience different levels of and types of review. Moreover, whether a
decision involves coverage or care is a matter of great dispute in the
courts, and thus another source of tension.
Governmental mandates of external review, even if they are what
patients purport to want, exacerbate the conflict and tensions present in
the health care system. How Americans obtain their health care
coverage is one source of such exacerbation. Another source is the
muddled state of the law, leaving decisions about preemption, coverage
and care to conflicting, complex authority.
210. See Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d 959, 971 (7th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, 121 S. Ct. 2589 (2001) (No. 00-1021).
211. See generally William M. Sage, Therapeutic Coverage: Embedding Medical
Professionalism in Health Insurance Contracts (Sept. 11, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (discussing false evidence in medicine and insurance functions in the law governing
health care with possible solutions). E. Haavi Morriem provides a thoughtful analysis of the
distinctions between and the qualities shared by coverage and medical treatment decisions in
today's health care system. See E. Haavi Morreim, Playing Doctor: Corporate Medical Practice
and Medical Malpractice, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 939 (1999).
212. See Illinois HMO External Review Law Upheld Under ERISA; High Court Appeal
Predicted, 9 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1625 (Oct. 26, 2000); see also Texas Seeks Supreme Court
Appeal of Decision Striking HMO Review Law, 6 Health Plan & Provider Rep. (BNA) 1358
(Nov. 8, 2000) (describing Texas briefs as detailing split in circuits).
213. Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1400 (2001); see Illinois HMO, supra
note 212, at 1625; see also HMO Seeks High Court Review of Illinois External-Appeal Statute, 7
Health Plan & Provider Rep. (BNA) 54 (Jan. 10, 2001); Supreme Court Seeks Federal Position
on Preemption of State HMO-Review Laws, 10 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 71 (Jan. 11, 2001).
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IV. A BROAD-BASED, CONTEXTUALIZED APPROACH WILL BE MORE
BENEFICIAL THAN AD Hoc INCORPORATION OF ADR MEASURES
Despite what has transpired in health care dispute resolution,
conflicts and tension remain. ADR suggestions that have been
implemented represent well-meaning attempts to resolve such conflicts
and tensions, at least when they erupt into disputes. Many of the
attempts implemented thus far, however, have involved mandated
adjudicatory ADR measures, which create as many issues, tensions and
sources of confusion as they manage to resolve. It would behoove the
health care industry to take this beginning at least one step further and
work on managing patient conflict at many points rather than resolving
disputes after they arise.
In elaborating on this suggestion, this Article will discuss the
differences between conflict and disputes and will outline a proposal,
focusing on how that proposal can help patients achieve a sense of
procedural justice in resolving health care disputes.214 Finally, it will
examine the goals of corporate members of the health care industry and
demonstrate why those goals also would be served by incorporation of
the outlined proposal.215
A. A Conflict Management Proposal
This Article has distinguished between the more generalized concept
of conflict and the narrower, more concrete, term "dispute." 216 It is
necessary at this point to elaborate on that distinction before discussing
the virtues of conflict management as compared to dispute resolution.
Institutions of all types experience conflict on a daily basis. Conflict
is "the process of expressing dissatisfaction, disagreement, or unmet
expectations with any organizational interchange. '" 217 When conflict
remains unresolved, it may escalate into a dispute, or a tangible and
concrete expression of that unresolved conflict centered around one or
214. See infra notes 216-29 and accompanying text.
215. See infra notes 230-48 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., supra note 15 (delineating the difference).
217. COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 15, at 5.
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more issues and positions. 218 Conflict is a natural, inevitable condition,
occurring daily, 219 especially in times of change. 220
Health care corporate executives and policymakers need to recognize
that conflict is ubiquitous in part because of the way health care is
delivered and financed through increasingly large corporate
organizations. There is no reason to believe that health care is less
plagued by conflict than other organizations. In fact, there are good
reasons to assume it may experience more than its share of conflict,
given the transition from fee-for-service provision of care to managed
care, the increasing size of the corporate entities involved in the
provision of care, and the previously mentioned regulatory concerns
riddling the industry. 221
The degree to which conflict is either harmful or beneficial is in part
determined by an organization's response to it. Generally,
organizations respond to conflict either by "fight" or by "flight." 222 An
organization can fight by belittling disputants rather than identifying the
cause of conflict, or it can launch a full-scale battle to support its
position regardless of merit.223 Alternatively, an organization engaging
in flight may engage in denial, avoidance or accommodation to avoid
dealing with and resolving conflict.224 To improve organizations'
efforts in dealing with conflict in new ways, some theorists have
suggested that organizations develop systems for exposing and
resolving dissatisfaction. 225  Rather than compartmentalizing dispute
resolution functions into one or a few departments, theorists propose
that organizations should cut across departmental lines, opening conflict
management efforts to interaction between and among various actors in
various areas of the organization. 226
218. Id. For example, Costantino and Merchant suggest that conflict exists when parties
disagree and that conflict has escalated into a dispute when one party decides to file suit against
the other. Id. "The conflict is the process and state of dissatisfaction; the dispute is the product
of the unresolved conflict." Id.
219. Id. at xvi; see also LEONARD J. MARCUS ET AL., RENEGOTIATING HEALTH CARE:
RESOLVING CONFLICT TO BUILD COLLABORATION, x (1995) (viewing conflict resolution as "a
regular function of... work").
220. William L. Ury, Foreward to COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 15, at ix.
221. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 219, at XXIX (suggesting that rather than seeing conflict as
failure, it must be seen as an "inevitable part of our work and relationships in health care").
222. COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 15, at 8.
223. Id. at 8.
224. Id. at 8-9.
225. Id. at 22.
226. Id. at 23-26.
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In such theories, conflict is seen as "inevitable and natural. 227
Rather than considering conflict as a problem to be solved, it represents
an opportunity to improve.228  Rather than dealing on an ad hoc basis
with individual disputes as they arise, conflict managers collaborate
with those involved on larger, systemic tensions revealed through
disputes. They attempt to work with various interest groups to resolve
the tension and, ideally, head off disputes. 229
1. Varied and Contextual Approaches to Suit Each Situation
In accordance with such recommendations, rather than incorporating
one type of ADR method, 230 health care industry executives and
policymakers should adopt a more broad-based and more multi-faceted
approach to the conflict prevalent in the industry. Just as medical
conditions, reaction to treatments, care plans, and patient perceptions
are all individual, no one type of ADR can fit all health care settings.
Solutions instead must be varied and contextual.
In particular, health care organizations should institute programs
cutting across internal departmental divisions.231  A good model may
resemble ombudsman programs, 232 which centralize authority for
conflict management efforts in a high-level office of relative
independence233 with authority to conduct far-ranging investigations
227. Id. at 56.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 56-57.
230. Id. at 33 (referring to ADR as a middle step between "fight or flight" and conflict
management systems).
231. Id. at 22-23 (suggesting that one mistake that has been made thus far with dispute
resolution efforts in organizations has been to compartmentalize them into their own
departments). The result, of course, is that conflict which could result in dispute is a matter to be
referred to "[choose a department]." (This may be Customer Service, or it may be Legal, for
example.) Others in the organization do not feel a need to assist in resolving the problem, and
indeed, they may be prevented from so assisting by turf wars or other interdepartmental territorial
concerns. Cf id. at 26, 62.
232. I refrain, however, from labeling my proposal an "ombudsman program" as such,
because of concerns expressed by ombudsmen that the term is being diluted and the role is
eroding due to its use in various settings without consideration of 'established models and core
values."' Ombudsmen Define Themselves, supra note 99. Nevertheless, as one corporate
ombudsman has stated, the shift from dispute resolution to conflict management is one which
seems to bring with it a need for ombudsman involvement. See Rowe & Gottehrer, supra note
101, at n.2 (remarks of Mary Rowe).
233. One might wonder whether any employee or officer within a health care organization can
be independent enough to truly assist fairly in conflict management efforts. It is easy to imagine,
for example, that an employee or officer would feel pressure always to resolve conflict in a way
that benefited his or her employer. Part of the position envisioned, however, like the positions of
internal ombudsmen or institutionally employed mediators, involves enforcing norms, not merely
reaching "good" results for the employer. Moreover, as will be seen in this section, achieving
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and, sometimes, to recommend various solutions to conflict. Under this
model, ideally, the patient encountering difficulty in dealing with a
health care entity will reach a key conflict management figure early in
the process. 234  This initial contact person (or members of an initial
contact staff) could discuss matters with patients, determine patients'
goals and help determine the proper action to move toward
resolution. 235  Such initial contact people would be ideally suited to note
and pass on, in the organizational hierarchy, the need for further
educational efforts. 236
In some instances, the provision of information, or the involvement
of a person from a particular department, could alleviate a patient's
feelings of dissatisfaction. When providing information or involving
other departments cannot resolve conflict, however, the initial contact
person can recommend the type of ADR that could best serve a patient's
needs, assuming ADR would serve those needs. 237
patient satisfaction is in the interests of the health care entity employing such a conflict
management official. See infra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
234. Skills that would tend to be important in this position would include active listening,
nonconfrontational questioning, and keen observation of the focus of the caller in presenting his
or her problem. Social workers, ombudsmen, nurses, psychiatrists, psychologists and members of
the clergy, among others, may be likely candidates to fill such positions. New positions with
specialized training may be required to fill in existing gaps in personnel. See David Mechanic,
Managed Care and the Imperative for a New Professional Ethic, 19 HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct.
2000, at 100, 109.
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners has suggested that state insurance
departments develop complaint analyst positions similar to the type of positions described here
for establishment by corporate members of the health care industry. See National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), Consumer Complaints White Paper 22 (June 2000) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Consumer Complaints White Paper].
235. Frank Sander and Stephen Goldberg similarly have recommended to attorneys that they
consider clients' needs and goals in determining whether to proceed to court or to some form of
ADR, as well as in determining how to decide among various methods of ADR. Frank E. A.
Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to
Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 49, 50 (1994).
236. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners, for example, has noted a need for
additional outreach and educational programs among insurance companies. See Consumer
Complaints White Paper, supra note 234, at 10.
237. Some disputes may require going to court, which should not be discouraged if necessary.
Resolution of important matters of public interest, for example, at least arguably should not be
relegated to a private, non-precedential dispute resolution process. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
Additionally, the initial contact person must remain aware that there exist serious concerns in
some settings with perpetuation and magnification of traditional power relationships or other
injustices that could arise in various ADR settings. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairness
and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L.
REV. 1359; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545 (1991).
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Experience on the Florida Managed Care Ombudsman Committee
suggests, for example, that patients experiencing conflict with their
health care provider or payor seek to voice their conflict regardless of
whether they have a legally cognizable dispute. Many patient
frustrations with the health care system stem from misunderstanding
and misinformation rather than from actual denials of rights. 23 8 Take,
for example, three cases crossing this author's desk as a volunteer with
the Committee in one three-week period. None of the three patients
calling for assistance presented problems more complex than difficulty
with navigating the system.
In one case, the caller was the mother of a small boy who had broken
his finger. His emergency care was handled promptly and without fuss,
but the caller encountered difficulty when she attempted, at the direction
of the emergency room physician, to obtain a referral to an orthopedic
surgeon for her son. Her primary care physician agreed with the need
for the referral, but the caller had been bounced back and forth three
times between the primary care physician's office and the specialist's
office. The primary care physician's office told her she had to secure an
appointment before the referral form could be completed. However, the
specialist's office told her she could not secure an appointment until the
receptionist there had received a response to an email requesting an
appointment time. The health care system was not at fault, rather, the
physicians' offices failed to treat their patients with respect and
understanding.
Perhaps in this situation the system could be improved by requiring a
different order of form completion, such as permitting completion of a
referral form without a specific physician appointment. Or perhaps the
health plan could better police its doctors and tell the physicians that it
expects more professional service from office staff working with health
plan patients. The caller's main complaint was the manner in which she
had been treated: by the time she contacted the Ombudsman Committee,
her son had been treated. She merely wanted to ensure that this did not
happen to others.
Such matters are the types that mediation might address to good
effect, if the experience of the Massachusetts Board of Medicine 239 is
238. David Mechanic has written that one of the sources of perceived injustice and unfairness
in the health care setting is the practice of managed care organizations' "depend[ing] more on
marketing slogans than on explaining carefully the terms of the contract, the trade-offs required,
and the basis of the types of limitations they will impose." Mechanic, supra note 234, at 104.
239. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (discussing Massachusetts Board pilot
project called Voluntary Mediation Program that allows patients to register complaints regarding
physicians).
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any indication. Seen as a mediation matter, the mother who sought to
improve practices for future patients seeking referrals actually presented
an opportunity for her managed care entity to improve the way it serves
patients. A consensual, problem-solving, negotiating session-perhaps
with a mediator-could help both sides feel as if progress was made on
that score, much as similar sessions appeared to resolve matters at the
Massachusetts medical licensing board.2 4° In contrast, a person seeking
coverage of a prescription, thus presenting a claim of entitlement under
an interpretation of contract language, may be best served by an
adjudicatory system of dispute resolution.
In a similar vein, the other two calls both involved patients who
simply did not know that they could achieve care on their own with one
simple telephone call each. In both of these cases, the patients had been
prescribed medications by their primary care physicians. In one case,
coverage of a woman's prescription was refused, and one phone call to
the health plan quickly clarified that the patient only needed to
telephone her physician and request that the office fax documentation of
her medical condition to her managed care organization. In more than
ninety percent of cases involving prescriptions of this medication for
this patient's condition, the plan said, the plan approved coverage of this
medication once the physician provided documentation.
In the other case, a managed care organization agreed to pay for one
prescription prescribed for a patient by his primary care physician, but
refused to pay for refills even though the primary care physician
prescribed refills. Again, all the patient had to do to achieve coverage
was call the physician and ask the physician's office to fax additional
documentation to the managed care organization.
It may be in these types of cases that the availability of a learned
intermediary 241 could help resolve the conflict patients feel. Such an
individual could help patients understand procedures for appeal and
policies governing managed care organizations' decisions. Certainly,
health care and health care coverage information are complex enough
that it would benefit patients to receive such assistance.
In these latter two cases, the patients would have been spared a great
deal of frustration if they simply had been better informed. In the first
case, the caller unfortunately went through a great deal of frustration,
but she sought to change the system to ensure that others did not have to
240. Id.
241. See MARC RODWIN, PROMOTING ACCOUNTABLE MANAGED HEALTH CARE: THE
POTENTIAL ROLE FOR CONSUMER VOICE 12, 27 (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.
indiana.edu/-speaweb/perspectives/vol5/html.
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go through such frustrations. The managed care companies in these
three cases were not violating anyone's rights; in all cases, the patient
received the requested care in the end. The patients, however, needed
assistance in negotiating the system, and they only realized they needed
such assistance after a dispute arose.
2. Consideration of Types of Patients When Determining
Appropriate Approach
Taking this eclectic range of patients' complaints into account, it is
important also to think about the characteristics of the patient in
question when determining which type of ADR would fit each patient's
needs. This idea parallels some of the work of John Conley and
William O'Barr. Conley and O'Barr have identified a distinction
between rights-oriented litigants and litigants they term relationship-
oriented, who "come to the legal system seeking redress for a wide
range of personal and social wrongs." 242  In a small claims court
context, Conley and O'Barr examined the way lay litigants approached
the legal system and the goals they sought to achieve through it, as
revealed through the language they used in pursuing their claims and
interacting with the courts.243  Their study revealed two sorts of
litigants: (1) relational ones, who sought to incorporate into their claims
notions of social need and entitlement as well as details about social
relationships; and (2) rule-oriented ones, who viewed the law as a set of
rules applying to factual situations irrespective of social status or
situation. 244  Unsurprisingly, rule-oriented litigants generally
experienced less discord as they moved through the legal system;
relational litigants were routinely frustrated.245 Relational litigants
wished the court would attend to their feelings as well as their actual
claims, but they were unlikely to achieve this goal unless their judge
was also relational in orientation. 246
Analogously, patients who describe their concerns by focusing on
rights and rules may feel quite comfortable and feel a sense of
procedural justice and participation in an adjudicatory setting such as
arbitration or external review. Those who want to discuss their entire
relationship with a health care entity, and who seek to incorporate in
242. JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE ix (1990).
243. Id. at ix-xiv.
244. Id. at 58-59.
245. Id. at 175.
246. Id. at 141, 174-75.
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their complaints both cognizable claims and relational concerns,
however, may be better served by mediation. In mediation they will
have an opportunity to exercise more control over process and to
express concerns that may play no role and may not be addressed in an
adjudicatory setting.
More specifically, the callers to the Managed Care Ombudsman
Committee who did not understand the need for documentation of a
doctor's prescription would have felt more fairly treated if someone had
simply explained, in an understandable, non-confrontational way, why
the managed care company was requesting documentation. In all
likelihood, had that step been taken, the discomfort of those patients
would not have escalated into disputes over the coverage of those
prescriptions.
247
3. The End Result: Conflict Management From Inception Through
Multiple End Points
The conflict management approach suggested herein thus involves a
more understanding, more accepting and more nuanced attitude on the
part of entities managing care when patients signal their dissatisfaction.
Such an approach would constitute a more "therapeutic" 248 method of
dealing with those patients, each of whose conflict may or may not rise
to the level of a dispute. While exact details of implementation would
vary depending on the particular way each managed care organization
chose to incorporate such change into its structure, broad tasks can be
enumerated here for the organizations wishing to do so.
First, entities managing care should provide conflict management
training to all those on the front line of receiving complaints from
patients. When patients or their family members call to express
frustration, a person with some level of training in conflict management
would be best-positioned to recognize the caller's angst and treat him or
her as a person rather than simply as the source of another complaint.
Providing such training to front-line customer service personnel would
enable them to better recognize and respond constructively when a
patient's complaint actually derives from confusion or feelings of being
247. Medical care providers also need to help. They should not, for example, express to
patients their impatience with utilization review efforts by a managed care company.
248. A field of law identified as "therapeutic jurisprudence" suggests that law should be
evaluated in terms of the therapeutic or anti-therapeutic effect on those it governs. See generally
DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY (1996) (examining the
application of therapeutic jurisprudential concepts in various legal settings). The approach
suggested in this Article, in the same vein, might be seen as a recommendation for "therapeutic
conflict management."
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overwhelmed. The improved assistance such personnel could provide
as a result would foster a feeling among callers that they have received
procedural justice from their contact with that managed care entity.
Second, managed care organizations should establish ombuds-type
offices to serve as the central point to which complaints not resolved by
more understanding front-line personnel could be referred. The staffs of
such offices can determine whether each referral is a simple matter of
lack of information or understanding or is a dispute requiring resolution
through established procedures. Thereafter, paying attention to the type
of complaint at issue and the type of person voicing it, the staff of such
an office can determine whether the complaint is the type best addressed
through the provision of information, mediation, a more adjudicatory
method of dispute resolution, or some other, more creative, solution.
Such offices would operate somewhat like the "multi-door courthouse"
system suggested by some commentators as a model for future
development of the judicial system. 249 It likely would be optimal in the
health care setting, however, for a member of the staff of such an office
additionally to serve as a conflict case manager, each remaining a
constant presence for the complainant throughout the procedures that
follow until resolution. 250
It would behoove managed care entities adopting this suggestion to
proactively identify certain events that likely will always cause great
fear, conceptual paralysis and confusion among patients and patients'
families. Some might be medical events; it might be, for example, that
any patient who is diagnosed as having a serious illness such as cancer
should automatically be assumed to be experiencing conflict. Provision
of an extra level of information to that patient and his or her family
automatically might be appropriate, and managed care entities thus
might avoid later conflict over issues such as whether the entity will
cover a form of cancer treatment that in reality has little chance of
success. 25 1 Other events almost certain to cause fear and confusion
might be clearly coverage-related; a managed care entity likely can
assume its patients and their families will experience conflict if the
entity is denying coverage of treatment involving some significant
amount of money. The entity, for example, could review its past
records to examine the dollar values of various treatments for which it
had refused coverage and to determine the instances in which patients
249. See, e.g., Ray & Clare, supra note 18.
250. Like case managers involved in coordinating care, these conflict case managers would
help each complainant as he or she proceeds through what may be several rather confusing steps.
251. I owe special thanks to Bill Sage for suggesting this idea.
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had litigated or pursued requests for coverage nearly to litigation.
Thereafter, based on the results of those reviews, it would be a
relatively simple matter to determine a dollar value above which
patients almost always hotly contested coverage denials. In light of this
information, the managed care entity could automatically refer to the
ombuds-type office described all complainants who expressed
dissatisfaction with denials of coverage involving treatment totaling that
dollar value or more.
In incorporating such suggestions, managed care entities should
ensure that their efforts are appropriately funded, staffed and supported.
In cases in which conflict arises through a lack of information or
understanding, for example, the inclination may be to use the ombuds-
type office to provide such information or to achieve such
understanding. That may work well, or it may result in expectations
that the staff of the ombuds-type office learn too much about too many
varied, specialized areas. In the latter instances, the staff of the
ombuds-type office should be supported in referring issues to learned
intermediaries separately situated within the corporate structure.
Similarly, in cases in which conflict appears, to the staff of the ombuds-
type office, to be best addressed through mediation, the inclination may
be to require that staff to act as the mediators. Again, this may work in
some situations, but such a procedure would require that all staff in the
ombuds-type office be trained as mediators; when all are not, the
complainant would be better served if the staff were to refer him or her
to trained mediators not located within that office. Continuity would be
assured to complainants if the staff of the ombuds-type office adopted
the case-management approach just discussed in order to follow matters
through from initial complaint to eventual resolution.
Taking this conflict management, rather than a dispute resolution,
approach to patients' problems in the health care industry could help
introduce some flexibility into a fairly rigid system of dispute
resolution. 25 2 Currently, patients "merely" experiencing dissonance or
252. Another source of flexibility should be some sort of temporal contextualization of dispute
resolution when conflict management fails. The current fashion has been to propose specific time
periods, usually in terms of hours or days, during which certain types of decisions must be made,
on a sliding scale ranging from expedited to normal procedure. There is a comfortable certainty
to such numbers; having such bright lines makes it easy to determine if participants in the process
are complying with the law's requirements. But, given that patients' goals vary, and that varying
types of ADR may satisfy patients' needs in various types of cases, definitive deadlines may be
too rigid. Rather than a bright-line, time-based rule, perhaps the standard should be patient
satisfaction with timeliness in attempting to reach resolution of various matters. Lawmakers may
wish to, and should, retain bright-line rules as clear indications of the outer margins of
acceptability, but the goal should be to resolve matters expeditiously, within a time frame that
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discomfort because they do not understand the bureaucratic process
often have nowhere to turn to receive information to ease their feelings
of conflict and tension. Patients who have no cognizable legal claims
but who seek to improve the procedures they experienced, such as the
mother who wanted to improve referral procedures, have no reliable
way to do that. Additionally, persons with cognizable legal claims have
available as options only pre-defined dispute resolution procedures
which may or may not satisfy their sense of procedural justice.
B. Why the Health Care Industry Should Care
The foregoing discussion is adequate from a patient advocate's point
of view. There appear to exist good reasons to support the health care
industry's adoption of broad-based conflict management techniques,
incorporating a contextualized approach to resolving disputes in
addition to managing conflict to avoid eruptions of dispute. The
industry should adopt such measures to make patients feel included in
the system.
Members of the health care industry, however, may not easily be
persuaded to employ such a system. After all, implementing such a
broad, multi-faceted proposal likely will be expensive and time-
consuming. It will require an organization-wide change of conflict
culture,253 and it will force industry executives to step back, focus on
and reconstruct the big picture rather than adopting cookie-cutter ADR
procedures into an existing picture. Once established, moreover, a
conflict management system of the sort described in this article carries
with it operating costs. It must be adequately funded; volunteer labor
will not suffice. 254  Additionally, those working within this conflict
serves the patient's needs for assurance and tension reduction, rather than to ensure coming in
within the number of hours or days specified for decision-making.
253. See COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 15, at 7-11.
254. Cf. Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution ADR in the Workplace Track I
Committee, Guidelines for the Design of Integrated Conflict Management Systems Within
Organizations, at http://www.spidr.org/article/icmsD.html (last modified Nov. 10, 2000)
(addressing conflict resolution in the workplace and urging in section 3.5.11 that "[s]ufficient
financial and human resources must be allocated to the system"). The author knows from
personal experience that a volunteer committee such as Florida's does not work well. It is too
easy for volunteers to allow their jobs and other commitments to prevent them from following up
on patient inquiries and problems. See FLA. SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH, AGING AND LONG-
TERM CARE, supra note 41, at 5 (attributing the ineffectiveness of Florida's Managed Care
Ombudsman Program in part to lack of funding). Underfunding is common among state-level
health care ombudsman programs. See Federal Grants for Ombudsman Programs Would Help
Consumers, 7 Health Plan & Provider Rep. (BNA) 435 (April 4, 2001); Issuance Program for
Health Insurance Consumers, S. 651, 107th Cong. (2001).
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management system must have sufficient authority and independence to
carry through on the promise of the system as conceived. 255
One might wonder why, then, any corporate entity in the health care
industry would invest in such an undertaking. The answer is simply that
members of the health care industry should invest in such efforts
because doing so will help them achieve their goals. Adoption of a
conflict management approach in health care would help health care
entities operate more efficiently and profitably while earning more of
the trust that is currently missing from their relationships with those
they serve.
Much has been written about the diminishing levels of trust
characterizing the health care industry since the advent of large-scale
efforts at managing care. Trust between patients and health care
providers is negatively affected by suspicions that health care providers
are elevating financial considerations over patient care concerns. 256
Trust between patients and health care entities (meaning managed care
or insurance entities) similarly has suffered from the industry's profit-
oriented, adversarial approaches to cutting health care costs. 25
7
This lack of trust can only be harmful to the health care industry.
First, a health care entity losing the trust of those patients with whom it
has relationships is likely to lose subscribers and thus money, for
patients likely will seek to exercise their rights to exit any health care
arrangement with which they are dissatisfied (i.e., that they no longer
trust).258 Second, great numbers of complaints, and general lack of
trust, cannot help but hurt an entity's reputation, which means that the
public will lose confidence in it.259  In that event, employers who
purchase health care coverage for their employees very well may decide
255. Otherwise, establishment of such a system could create a sense of "false consciousness."
See LIND & TYLER, supra note 3, at 4 (defining "'false consciousness"').
256. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000); MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE,
MONEY AND MORALS: PHYSICIAN'S CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (1993); Mark 0. Hiepler & Brian
C. Dunn, Irreconcilable Differences: Why the Doctor-Patient Relationship is Disintegrating at
the Hands of Health Maintenance Organizations and Wall Street, 25 PEPP. L. REv. 597 (1998).
257. See, e.g., Pegram, 530 U.S. at 2l1; Marc A. Rodwin, Exit and Voice in American Health
Care, 32 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1041 (1999); cf. David Mechanic & Marsha Rosenthal,
Responses of HMO Medical Directors to Trust Building in Managed Care, 77 MILBANK Q. 283
(1999), available at http://www.milbank.org/quarterly/7703feat.htm (discussing managed care
organizations introducing practices to enhance public credibility and encourage individuals to put
more trust in physicians).
258. See RODWIN, supra note 256, at 1053-57 (noting that some patients are not able to exit,
for they have only one option).
259. See Mechanic & Rosenthal, supra note 257, at 284 (noting that reputation is "a critical
dimension of public confidence in larger institutions, including [managed care organizations]").
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to stop working with the entity with a poor reputation, thus
institutionally deciding to exit, rather than leaving exit decisions to
individuals.
Internally undertaken actions to this effect, moreover, are more likely
to increase trust than are externally imposed ADR procedures. 260
Imposition of ADR measures by an outside entity (such as the
government) implies social distrust of the managed care entity, leading
to patient distrust of that entity. 261 By adopting conflict management
measures on its own initiative, the managed care entity will foster a
sense among its patients both that the entity is trustworthy and that they
will generally receive procedural justice in dealing with it.262
Ultimately, there exists in this conflict management proposal a real
opportunity to improve the operation of the health care industry. Health
care entities could improve their procedures by listening carefully to the
sources of conflict patients describe. The eventual result could be an
increase in business through increased patient satisfaction. Improving
patient education in response to tensions created by lack of information
or by mis-information can only help the organization to run more
smoothly in the future. Rather than presenting examples of failure, to
be resisted, patients reporting conflict and tension actually present
organizations with opportunities to improve the situation and avert
future disputes.
V. CONCLUSION
It thus makes good business sense for health care organizations to
invest now in conflict management, offering contextualized ADR
possibilities rather than cookie-cutter mandates to patients expressing
complaints. Rather than reacting only to cognizable disputes and
imposing one-size-fits-all attempts at resolution short of a courtroom,
the health care industry should begin to work positively with the
conflict and tensions present in the health care system. Doing so will
increase patients' senses of satisfaction with the system and the way it
treats them. It will also benefit health care entities, for they will gain in
trust and reputation, leading to a better financial position.
260. See Mark A. Hall, Trust, Law and Medicine: Towards a Therapeutic Jurisprudence of
Health Care Delivery 44 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
261. Id.
262. Cf LIND & TYLER, supra note 3, at 78 (noting "the judgments of process fairness were
consistently the major factor involved in generalizations from personal experience to system-level
views").
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